The limits to the sanctions regime against Syria by Seeberg, Peter
Syddansk Universitet
The limits to the sanctions regime against Syria
Seeberg, Peter
Published in:
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
DOI:
10.2815/710375
Publication date:
2015
Document license
Unspecified
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Seeberg, P. (2015). The limits to the sanctions regime against Syria. In I. Dreyer, & J. Luengo-Cabrera (Eds.),
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools (1. ed., Chapter VI, pp. 67-75). Paris and Brussels: EU Institute
for Security Studies.  (Reports; No. 25). DOI: 10.2815/710375
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Apr. 2017
REPORT Nº 25 — September 2015
On target? EU 
sanctions as 
 security policy 
tools 
EDITED BY
Iana Dreyer 
José Luengo-Cabrera
WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY 
Sara Bazoobandi, Thomas Biersteker, 
Richard Connolly, Francesco Giumelli,  
Clara Portela, Stanislav Secrieru,  
Peter Seeberg and Peter A.G. van Bergeijk
 
Reports
European
Union
Institute for
Security Studies
EU Institute for Security Studies
100, avenue de Suffren
75015 Paris
http://www.iss.europa.eu
Director: Antonio Missiroli
© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015. 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. 
ISBN 978-92-9198-369-8
ISSN 2363-264X
QN-AF-15-003-EN-N
Doi: 10.2815/710375
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. 
Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon. 
Cover photograph: credit: Charles Sykes/AP/SIPA 
CONTENTS
Foreword 5
Antonio Missiroli
Introduction 7
Iana Dreyer and José Luengo-Cabrera
I. How and when do sanctions work? The evidence 17
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk and Thomas Biersteker
II. The impact of EU economic sanctions on Russia 29
Richard Connolly
III. Have EU sanctions changed Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine? 39
Stanislav Secrieru
IV. Sanctions against Iran: a preliminary economic assessment 49
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk
V. Sanctions against Iran: winners and losers 57
Sara Bazoobandi
VI. The limits to the sanctions regime against Syria 67
Peter Seeberg
Conclusions 75
Iana Dreyer, José Luengo-Cabrera, Francesco Giumelli and Clara Portela
ISSReportNo.25
 
Annexes 85
 Task Force meetings 85
 Core Task Force members  86
 List of Task Force Briefs and Alerts  87
 Bibliography  88
 Abbreviations 89
 Notes on the contributors 91
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is the outcome of an EUISS Task Force on sanctions that has worked 
throughout the spring of 2015. The Task Force has involved personnel from the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council, high-level European 
academics, and the EUISS.
We would like to thank in particular Thomas Biersteker (Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies), Peter van Bergeijk (Erasmus University 
of Rotterdam), Clara Portela (Singapore Management University) and Francesco 
Giumelli (University of Groningen) for being actively engaged throughout the 
project as core members of the Task Force and for authoring several EUISS 
publications and contributing to this report. We would also like to thank the EEAS 
Sanctions Policy Division for their helpful feedback in the run-up to the report’s 
publication. In addition, we extend our gratitude to Anete Stipniece (Latvian 
Permanent Representation to the EU) and Matej Pediček (General Secretariat of the 
Council) for their valuable participation and input throughout the meetings.
We also wish to thank Sara Bazoobandi (Regent’s University and Chatham House), 
Edward Hunter Christie (NATO), Richard Connolly (University of Birmingham and 
Chatham House), Maria Lipman (European Council on Foreign Relations), Erica 
Moret (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), Rouzbeh 
Parsi (Lund University), Stanislav Secrieru (Polish Institute of International Affairs), 
Peter Seeberg (University of Southern Denmark), Ali Vaez (International Crisis 
Group) and Rachel Ziemba (Roubini Global Economics) for having offered their 
input during the various events organised as part of this project.
Nicu Popescu and Florence Gaub, Senior Analysts at the EUISS, actively 
participated in most of the Task Force group meetings and provided helpful input 
for the preparation of the Iran, Syria and Russia-focused roundtables. José Luengo-
Cabrera, Associate Analyst, and Iana Dreyer, Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS, 
have managed the project.
The responsibility for the content of this report lies exclusively with the EUISS.

On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
5 
FOREWORD
Sanctions have increasingly become important security policy tools – by design 
as well as by default. Whenever countries (especially Western countries) are 
confronted with an international security crisis in which they agree that they 
cannot (or will not) use military force, resorting to various types of restrictive 
measures has proved to be a way of showing a willingness to react and to influence 
developments – past, present and future.
Sometimes symbolic, and therefore mainly declaratory, but often aimed at 
exercising some form of ‘civilian’ deterrence – by other means, so to speak – EU 
sanctions have recently increased in frequency, intensity and saliency. But we tend 
to forget that European ‘foreign policy’ used sanctions from the outset (against 
South Africa, in the late 1980s) and always waved them as a possible form of 
political pressure on reluctant interlocutors – whenever positive diplomacy, based 
on incentives and rewards, failed. 
Over the years, subsequent ‘generations’ of sanctions have been enforced – by the 
international community as well as the EU itself: comprehensive or, more recently, 
targeted; multilateral or, as is increasingly the case, unilateral – or rather mini-
lateral. Opinions regarding their ‘effectiveness’ have varied significantly, depending 
also on the political lenses of the beholder – but empirical expert analysis can now 
offer a judicious evaluation of their intended and unintended consequences. 
The EUISS Task Force that, under the stewardship of Iana Dreyer and José Luengo-
Cabrera, has produced this report aimed from the outset at combining the functional 
and regional expertise of academics and the operational experience of policymakers 
with a view to offering a balanced assessment of the impact of EU sanctions in 
contexts in which they served an explicit security policy function: in Iran, Syria 
and, since last year, Russia. After first addressing the topic in 2012/13 – with the 
publication of an Occasional Paper by Charlotte Beaucillon and a Chaillot Paper by 
Francesco Giumelli1– the Institute has revisited this aspect of EU ‘foreign policy’ by 
trying to highlight the complexity of the discourse on sanctions, their use and their 
alleged ‘effectiveness’, while providing an original narrative to evaluate their impact 
and scope. This report, coupled with the other short(er) publications produced by 
the Task Force, offers  valuable insight into a practice that is now part and parcel 
of the Union’s ‘security’ policy toolbox – although it is rarely conceptualised and 
evaluated as such.
Antonio Missiroli
Paris, September 2015
1. See Charlotte Beaucillon,’Comment choisir ses mesures restrictives? Guide pratique des sanctions de l’UE’, Occasional 
Paper no. 100, EUISS, December 2012, and Francesco Giumelli, ‘How EU sanctions work: a new narrative’, Chaillot 
Paper no. 129, EUISS, May 2013.
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INTRODUCTION
Iana Dreyer and José Luengo-Cabrera 
Sanctions are part of a panoply of tools used by the European Union to further the 
goals of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Called ‘restrictive meas-
ures’ in official EU language, they are imposed against target governments, com-
mercial entities and individuals to penalise a policy or course of action that contra-
venes international law and political norms.  
Over the past two decades, the EU has made increasing use of sanctions. Its role as 
an international sanctions ‘sender’ is now comparable to that of the United States, 
the world’s biggest sanctioning power. While its position has historically been com-
plementary to the United Nations’ (UN) sanctions regimes, the EU has in recent 
years imposed unilateral sanctions more frequently.
EU sanctions goals vary and aim to address different CFSP objectives which include: 
conflict management (Afghanistan in 1996, Libya and Syria in 2011); democracy 
and human rights promotion (Belarus in 2006, Syria in 2011); post-conflict insti-
tutional consolidation (Guinea in 2009); nuclear non-proliferation (Libya in 1994, 
Iran since 2006); countering international terrorism (Libya in 1999 and terrorist 
organisations on the EU list); and, more recently, condemning and containing the 
violation of a sovereign state’s territorial integrity (Russia 2014).
Sanctions come in different forms: asset freezes; travel, visa and investment bans; 
withdrawal of financial aid; arms, commodities and trade embargoes; restrictions 
on banking transactions – just to name the most important ones. They serve mul-
tiple purposes by way of coercing a change in proscribed behaviour, constraining 
a target’s capacity for discretionary action, or acting as a signalling device to deter 
future transgressions of international norms. 
The EU’s sanctions policy (along with that of the US and the UN) has evolved in 
tandem with the rising number of sanctions regimes. Prompted by the need to miti-
gate the unintended negative consequences of comprehensive sanctions (such as 
large-scale trade or oil embargoes) on civilian populations, senders have increasing-
ly shifted their sanctions policy to a system of ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions such as 
asset freezes or travel bans. These specifically target commercial entities (both pri-
vate and state-owned) or top-level decision-makers engaged in the activities that the 
sender seeks to penalise. Moreover, this fine-tuning of sanctions as policy instru-
ments has been driven by an attempt to avert the counterproductive effects brought 
about by comprehensive sanctions, which often generate rent-seeking opportuni-
ties that can entrench the power positions of the targets at fault.
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It is now largely recognised that sanctions – whether comprehensive or targeted 
– tend to be embedded in wider strategies that involve other policy instruments, 
ranging from diplomatic engagement to the threat or actual use of force. It is there-
fore important to view sanctions in context as they are seldom imposed in isolation 
from other measures. Consequently, while the complementarity of different policy 
instruments serves to reinforce their overall intended impact, it hinders the capac-
ity to isolate and identify the causal effects of sanctions, thereby raising questions 
regarding their underlying effectiveness.  
At a time when the EU’s track record as a sanctioning actor remains somewhat 
mixed, assessing the conditions under which restrictive measures tend to deliver 
on their desired outcome appears as a necessity to improve the way in which fu-
ture sanctions regimes are strategically designed. Through the lens of an empiri-
cal framework and a selection of applied case studies, this report aims to support 
evidence-based policymaking. 
Although imperfect statistical data and the ubiquitous confluence of factors often 
undermine evaluations of the causal effect of sanctions, this report corroborates 
the assertion that (pre-)conditions matter in determining when and how sanctions 
work. Amid lingering questions over their utility in restraining the proscribed ac-
tions of the Assad regime in Syria, curbing Iran’s nuclear programme or softening 
Russia’s aggressive stance on Ukraine, the EU stands to benefit from a balanced, 
empirically-informed assessment on how sanctions have been implemented, moni-
tored and enforced. 
The EU as a sanctioning actor
The EU’s increasing activity in the field of sanctions has enhanced its visibility as 
a foreign policy actor on the international stage. The incorporation of restrictive 
measures within the CFSP ‘pillar’ serves to further the Union’s endeavour to be-
come an increasingly active security provider. Consequently, it has been relying on 
the imposition of sanctions as a way to address security issues within and beyond 
its neighbourhood. 
As the cases of Iran, Russia and Syria highlight, EU sanctions have been imposed 
to address situations that constitute a threat to international security. By way of 
penalising policies or activities deemed to be spreading insecurity within a targeted 
state and beyond, the EU has implemented sanctions as security policy tools. Amid 
significant financial constraints, EU sanctions have emerged as cost-effective instru-
ments. Currently constituting a relatively minor drain on the EU budget, they repre-
sent an attractive option in the absence of alternative means of coercion.
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
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Lacking significant military capabilities of its own, the EU has a comparative ad-
vantage in the use of economic sanctions as a form of coercive diplomacy. As the 
world’s largest trading entity, a major global investor and the largest global aid do-
nor, it has real economic leverage vis-à-vis sanctioned targets. Nonetheless, the EU’s 
share of global output is progressively shrinking as the world economy’s centre of 
gravity shifts to Asia and other emerging markets, with potential long-term implica-
tions for its sanctions policy.  
The growing volume and political salience of EU sanctions points to the fundamen-
tal role they play as CFSP tools. To date, the EU has 37 sanctions regimes in place – a 
fivefold increase when compared to 1991 and more than double the number that 
existed in 1999 – with a record list of targeted non-state entities and individuals. 
While the EU has become a prolific imposer of restrictive measures akin to the US, 
as a sui generis supra-national entity, the Union continues to encounter significant 
challenges that hinder its ability to deliver on its sanctions expectations. Overcom-
ing (or at least attenuating) these hindrances would contribute to reducing the 
downside risks with which the EU is recurrently confronted as a sanctioning actor.
Figure 1: Evolution of CFSP sanctions regimes
Source for data: De Vries, Portela & Guijarro-Usobiaga (2014); European External Action Service
10 
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Decision-making
The mere fact that the Union is composed of 28 member states already sheds light 
on the complex nature of its decision-making structure. Reflecting the degree to 
which sanctions are a highly politicised issue, positions on sanctions vary signifi-
cantly across member states, with opposition to implementation often being great-
est when commercial ties with targets are highest. The required Council unanimity 
on decision-making procedures acts as a barrier to setting up sanctions regimes in 
an expeditious manner. Cases such as the oil and gas embargo on Iran highlight 
the disparities that emerge when some member states are more adversely affected 
than others. Given Greece, Italy and Spain’s heavier reliance on Iranian oil imports, 
the EU’s oil ban was implemented six months after it was agreed so as to allow 
these three countries to secure new sources of provision. Although compensatory 
schemes are often put in place, domestic political consensus on the reasons for ini-
tiating the sanctions regime may trump short-term economic considerations, as is 
currently the case with restrictive measures against Russia in some Central Euro-
pean countries. Consequently, the protracted negotiations required for reaching 
consensus inside the EU often provide targets with breathing space to adapt and 
circumvent future sanctions. Streamlining the decision-making process would pro-
vide an opportunity to shorten the implementation time-frame, but there seems to 
be little appetite for doing that. 
In Brussels itself, the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the European Exter-
nal Action Service (EEAS) all have a role in sanctions design and decision-making. 
This fragmentation often slows down implementation in crisis contingencies that 
require rapid action. Although the Council managed to swiftly achieve unanimity 
in the case of sanctions imposed against Russia, there is no guarantee that this will 
become standard practice. The inevitable internal compromises over the extent and 
nature of EU sanctions imply that decisions can be sub-optimal.
Implementation and enforcement
Weak implementation and enforcement procedures appear as additional limitations 
to the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. Once restrictive measures are adopted, the 
resources dedicated to monitoring and compliance at EU level fall short of what is 
effectively required. Indeed, given that these competences fall within the purview of 
member states’ law-enforcement agencies, measuring the extent to which sanctions 
are being implemented and enforced inevitably lacks EU-wide coordination, leading 
to uncertainty over whether sanctions are fulfilling their intended objectives. In the 
absence of an EU agency akin to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), 
there is no standard procedure to verify the degree of compliance. With disparities 
in the capacity (as well as willingness) of member states to implement, monitor and 
enforce sanctions, loopholes which targets can exploit are more likely to appear. 
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
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Legality
In addition, the EU has been faced with a series of challenges filed by sanctioned 
entities and individuals at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This derives princi-
pally from the difficulty of providing sufficient evidence regarding the alleged links 
between sanctioned entities or individuals and the target regimes at fault. The Kadi 
II case has been telling in this respect, following a ruling by the ECJ in favour of three 
Syrian businessmen who were unlawfully listed under the Syria sanctions regime. 
Citing a lack of substantive evidence to prove any links between the three individu-
als and the Assad regime, the EU was obliged to pay them damage compensation. 
Similarly, the ongoing contestations filed by the Russian company Rosneft and the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) have raised concerns about the evidence put 
forth by the Council to justify the listing of commercial entities under sanctions 
regimes as well as the extent to which classified information can or should be used 
in such proceedings.
In sum, although the EU has taken major steps to hone the way in which sanc-
tions regimes are designed, it is still confronted with a learning curve with regard 
to its ability to implement and enforce them. There is indeed much to be celebrated 
vis-à-vis its rising reputation as a responsive sanctioning actor, especially in view of 
its readiness both to condemn and penalise reprehensible behaviour and to reward 
progressive compliance – yet challenges remain, and addressing them effectively is 
made more difficult by the Union’s own internal economic difficulties. 
Report overview        
This report is the product of a EUISS Task Force on EU sanctions that ran from 
February to July 2015, which included academics and think tank experts – combin-
ing functional knowledge of sanctions and relevant regional expertise – as well as EU 
officials. A series of roundtable meetings were organised to engage participants in 
an open discussion about the EU’s sanctions regimes against Iran, Russia and Syria. 
Resulting from the expert insights gathered throughout the meetings – as well as 
some participants’ contributions to a series of shorter EUISS publications dedicat-
ed to the issue – this report represents a collection and synthesis of the Task Force 
members’ insights and findings. 
Through a mix of quantitative and qualitative evaluations, individual chapters take 
an in-depth look at a selected sample of sanctions regimes and offer informed in-
sight showcasing what the available evidence can tell us about the conditions under 
which EU sanctions tend to have their biggest impact. The Task Force was not ex-
pected, however, to assess the economic cost of sanctions on the EU itself nor the 
possible ways in which the EU institutions could be streamlined to impose and im-
12 
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plement sanctions in a more efficient manner – however important these issues may 
indeed be. Finally, given that the sanctions regimes considered here are all ongoing, 
the contributions in this report need to be seen as a preliminary evaluation of the 
situation as it stood at the time of writing (mid-2015). 
The most important feature – and added value – of this report is the fact that the 
cases are seen through the lens of an empirical analytical framework presented by 
two eminent sanctions scholars: Thomas Biersteker, from the Graduate Institute 
in Geneva, and Peter van Bergeijk, from Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Thomas 
Biersteker has steered the UN Targeted Sanctions Consortium, which has worked 
for many years on the evaluation of UN sanctions’ effectiveness. Peter van Bergeijk 
is an economist who has written extensively on sanctions policy and is familiar with 
the outstanding work on sanctions carried out by the Peterson Institute for Interna-
tional Economics in Washington DC. These scholars have synthesised the latest in-
sights offered by empirical research and academic literature on sanctions, drawing 
from various disciplines (economics, political science, sociology and psychology). 
This literature has so far focused strongly on UN and US sanctions. Yet, as this re-
port shows, its findings offer a powerful prism through which to also assess current 
EU sanctions regimes. 
By building on the framework presented by Francesco Giumelli in the Institute’s 
Chaillot Paper no. 129 on EU sanctions (2013), the report adopts a ‘new narrative’ on 
how sanctions’ effectiveness can be conceptualised. Acknowledging the validity of 
mainstream interpretations, the report endorses a paradigm shift whereby the ‘suc-
cess’ of sanctions is not merely determined by the extent to which they coerce tar-
gets into changing their proscribed behaviour. Indeed, alternative (or complemen-
tary) interpretations of effectiveness vindicate an approach based on the relative, as 
opposed to absolute, impact of sanctions. By measuring the success of sanctions 
through the degree to which they constrain targets in pursuing their discretionary 
course of action – as well as how they can act as signalling devices to deter future 
wrongdoings – such an approach counters the pessimistic views that have long per-
vaded the sanctions literature. In an attempt to assess whether EU sanctions are ‘on 
target’, the case studies examine the appropriateness of adopting a more nuanced 
framework of analysis whereby sanctions’ effectiveness is interpreted as the degree 
to which their coercing, constraining and signalling effects prompt targets to com-
ply progressively.
Last but not least, this report aims to shed more light on an EU policy area that is 
still under-researched at a time when sanctions are becoming more important in 
terms of their number, scale and political salience. The editors therefore hope that 
this report will provide impetus for others to undertake more evidence-based and 
open-minded research and analysis. 
*                 *                 *
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
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The report is divided into six chapters. Chapter I provides the analytical framework 
for the report. Thomas Biersteker and Peter van Bergeijk offer a non-exhaustive ex-
ploration of the conditions under which sanctions are likely to be successful.
The chapter posits that sanctions pursue multiple goals and that their effectiveness 
needs to be assessed against how they achieve three main goals: (1) Coercing — the ex-
tent to which sanctions modify the target’s cost-benefit calculation of pursuing its 
proscribed policy; (2) Constraining — the extent to which sanctions reduce a target’s 
ability to pursue its objectionable actions; and (3) Signalling — the extent to which 
the threat of future sanctions allows the sender to notify targets of its intended ac-
tions and likely course of action in the foreseeable future. 
The text outlines seven major (pre-)conditions for sanctions success: pre-sanctions 
trade volumes need to be important enough for economic sanctions to bite; sanc-
tions tend to succeed most in the initial years of implementation; the psychology 
of sanctions is extremely important (expectations, credibility and strategic interac-
tion) in shaping their outcome; sanctions are more likely to succeed if the target is 
more democratic (or rather, less authoritarian); strong multilateral political com-
mitment makes sanctions more effective; narrowly defined goals and multiple pol-
icy instruments increase the success rate of sanctions; and ‘targeted’ sanctions can 
be almost as effective as comprehensive sanctions in achieving their intended goals. 
The chapter concludes by highlighting that senders tend to find it very difficult to 
end sanctions regimes, whether sanctions have proved to be successful or not.
Chapter II, written by Richard Connolly, offers an initial assessment of the eco-
nomic impact of the trade and financial sanctions imposed on Russia in response 
to its annexation of Crimea in March 2014, its subsequent interventions in Eastern 
Ukraine, and its suspected involvement in the shooting down of the MH17 flight 
in July 2014. Connolly highlights the difficulty in estimating the exact impact of 
sanctions on the Russian economy given their interaction with other major shocks 
that have befallen it at the same time, notably a sudden fall in the oil price and a dra-
matic depreciation of the rouble. These shocks came at a time when investor confi-
dence in the Russian economy was already waning due to its underlying structural 
weaknesses and capital flight already high. The chapter highlights that the impact 
of sanctions has been greatest in the financial sector, principally due to the fact that 
so many Russian corporations heavily depend on access to Western capital markets 
for external financing. The author argues that the financial sector restrictions im-
posed by the West will most likely have their strongest impact in three to five years. 
The chapter also briefly assesses the impact of Russia’s countersanctions (bans on 
food imports from Western countries) on its own economy.
In Connolly’s view, sanctions have had the counterproductive effect of strengthen-
ing elite cohesion in Russia. The state has channelled its resources to politically con-
nected patrons and to state-dependent economic sectors in industry and agricul-
14 
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ture. This, in turn, has bolstered popular support for the regime in constituencies 
that have benefited from import substitution and has contributed to strengthening 
the country’s protectionist mindset. There has also been a strong ‘rally around the 
flag’ effect in Russian public opinion, whereby support for the country’s leaders has 
reached record levels as reflected in independent opinion polls. Russia’s responsive-
ness to sanctions thus appears limited. 
Chapter III is complementary to the previous one and focuses on the interactions 
between the EU’s sanctions policy and Russia’s actual behaviour on the ground in 
Eastern Ukraine since 2014. Stanislav Secrieru argues that, contrary to statements 
from Moscow and to frequently aired views in the public debate, sanctions have 
to some extent contributed to limiting the Kremlin’s options in the Donbass. Al-
though Russia has been partially successful in its endeavours to weaken the Ukrain-
ian state both economically and politically regardless of sanctions, the EU restric-
tive measures have played a role in limiting Russia’s territorial ambitions. Sanctions 
have astutely interplayed with diplomatic efforts via the Minsk ceasefire negotiation 
process and contributed to bringing Moscow to the negotiating table. Secrieru also 
contends that sanctions (in tandem with other support measures from Ukraine’s 
Western partners) were critical in providing breathing space for the Ukrainian state, 
giving it room to strengthen its military capabilities. 
Chapter IV, written by Peter van Bergeijk, offers a preliminary economic evaluation 
of the impact of sanctions against Iran. The chapter presents an econometric model 
that helps assess their impact. The author argues that some key pre-conditions were 
met for the sanctions to be effective: important trade linkages with the sanctions 
sender, limited options for import substitution and the comprehensive nature of 
the restrictive measures. Van Bergeijk further analyses how sanctions have impacted 
on the Iranian polity and infers a link between the imposition of sanctions and 
higher political turnover. In other words, sanctions have indirectly influenced the 
recent change in political leadership in Iran under President Rouhani, who had 
campaigned under the pledge to resume negotiations over the country’s nuclear 
programme.
In chapter V, Sara Bazoobandi explores why the recent sanctions imposed against 
Iran have been so severe and how they have impacted the domestic political sphere. 
In combination with macroeconomic mismanagement in Tehran, the comprehen-
sive nature of sanctions (the oil embargo, the country’s exclusion from the SWIFT 
international payments system) has affected the Iranian economy very negatively. 
The chapter further offers an insightful breakdown of how sanctions have hit differ-
ent segments of the population according to their levels of income, and shows that 
middle class households were most adversely affected. This, in turn, explains the 
latter’s support for regime leaders favourable to negotiating a deal over the coun-
try’s nuclear programme. Bazoobandi shows that individuals with affinities to the 
regime have benefited from the rent-seeking and corruption opportunities provided 
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
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by sanctions, thus reinforcing inequality between the richest and poorest segments 
of society. The chapter further argues that sanctions have been effective in induc-
ing the Iranian authorities into making concessions during negotiations over the 
country’s nuclear programme, resulting in the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA). 
In chapter VI, Peter Seeberg explores how the complex conflict dynamics in Syria 
and the lack of international coordination have undermined the potency of sanc-
tions. Although constraining, their impact has been partial due to shifting dynam-
ics on the ground, in particular the way in which the expansion of Islamic State 
(IS) arguably prompted targeted individuals to reinforce their ties with the Assad 
regime. Moreover, the lack of a coherent multilateral coalition of sanctioning actors 
enabled targets to capitalise on regional and international circumvention channels. 
The chapter puts forward the idea that although sanctions have had a constraining 
effect by way of undermining the regime’s access to economic resources, adverse 
security developments have distorted the channels through which sanctions tend 
to work most effectively.
The concluding chapter, co-authored with Clara Portela and Francesco Giumelli, 
reviews all these case studies through the lens of the analytical framework presented 
in chapter I. The chapter discusses some policy implications and priorities for the 
EU based on the findings of this report as well as the discussions held during the 
EUISS Task Force meetings, especially how to build up EU capabilities in designing 
sanctions, engaging third countries, and devising viable exit strategies. The chapter 
also suggests some further avenues for research and analysis.
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I. HOW AND WHEN DO SANCTIONS WORK? 
THE EVIDENCE
Thomas Biersteker and Peter A.G. van Bergeijk
Introduction
The debate on the usefulness of sanctions as a foreign and security policy tool fol-
lows a familiar pattern. Proponents of sanctions cite well-known success stories, 
while opponents highlight evident failures.  This is not surprising, because sanc-
tions are a highly political issue, with both sides of the debate persuasively arguing 
their case. But the choice of examples selected to make a case for or against sanc-
tions is often biased, and not much can be learned from case studies drawn from 
skewed samples. 
The aim of this chapter is to move the debate forward, in the direction of more 
evidence-based policymaking.  Our point of departure is that the use of sanctions 
should be preceded by a strategic evaluation of their appropriateness in a specific 
case. This will help to improve the selection of distinct types of targeted sanctions, 
because gaining a clear understanding of the determinants of success and failure of 
sanctions in the past is a prerequisite for better evidence-based sanction design. Ev-
idence-based policymaking needs to consider both failures and successes. It is only 
by studying successes, failures and intermediate outcomes that we can understand 
the determinants of sanction efficacy.
One important fact that emerges from empirical research on sanctions is that their 
rate of success is low. But this same empirical research also reveals under what con-
ditions sanctions do work. The widely used Peterson Institute for International Eco-
nomics sanctions database, which covers almost 200 cases, shows that sanctions 
fail to achieve their policy goals in about two out of three cases. The more recent 
research of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) on United Nations (UN) tar-
geted sanctions suggests an even lower rate of success: on average, in less than one 
in four instances. 
The fact that the majority of sanctions policies fail, however, does not necessarily 
imply that sanctions are not effective. Firstly, the effectiveness of sanctions depends 
on the alternative policy instruments available to policy practitioners. Secondly, if 
basic conditions for success are not met or if the agreed measures are not imple-
mented, then a sanction should actually be expected to fail. For example, if no or 
very little economic or diplomatic exchange was taking place before sanctions were 
enacted, then the impact of sanctions will inevitably be weaker. 
18 
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It is also important to emphasise at the outset that sanctions are rarely, if ever, 
implemented alone or in isolation from other foreign and security policy instruments. 
Active negotiations, peace mediation efforts, threats of force, use of force, peacekeeping 
operations, and/or covert operations: all co-exist with the application of sanctions. 
Accordingly, sanctions should be evaluated from the standpoint of an integrated 
approach to international peace and security that takes these other measures into 
consideration and looks at their interactive effects.
Sanctions tend to have a strong economic dimension to them. But economic sanctions 
– such as trade or commodity embargoes or financial sanctions – should not be studied 
as purely economic phenomena: they require a multidisciplinary analysis in order to be 
understood. Economists can and do contribute to this understanding by identifying 
the actual sanction damage ex post and, more importantly, the potential ex ante sanction 
damage that constitutes the threat of (further) implementation. Economic models can 
also clarify how targets behave and engage in activities to substitute for trade losses 
due to sanctions. Beyond those questions, however, the economist needs to work with 
scholars from other disciplines including law, political science, sociology, and (applied) 
psychology. These disciplines bring in institutional analysis, implementation processes 
and important elements such as legitimacy and reputation.
The key issue, then, is not the probability of sanctions’ effectiveness, but why 
sanctions succeed and why they fail. What are the conditions for success? And how 
do sanctions actually work?
This chapter addresses these questions and offers an overview of the key lessons 
the most up-to-date academic and empirical research on sanctions can provide for 
those designing and analysing sanctions policies. 
Goals of sanctions
In order to understand how and whether sanctions work, a first step is to realise 
that sanctions goals are multiple, and that effectiveness is best measured against the 
actual goal of each (set of) sanction(s).
Most of the public, policy, and scholarly discussions of sanctions proceed from the 
assumption that sanctions are intended primarily to coerce a change in the behav-
iour of the targeted party. While this is most certainly one of the principal reasons 
for the application of sanctions, and often a central part of the rhetorical justifica-
tions for their use, coercion is not the only goal of sanctions. 
When it is highly unlikely that a target can be coerced into giving up power or reneg-
ing on some larger revolutionary cause (whether that cause is motivated by political 
ideology or religious extremism), the goal of sanctions can be to constrain a target 
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in its ability to engage in proscribed activities. Sanctions can raise the costs of the 
target’s activities or force it into costly changes with regard to strategy and the pro-
curement of supplies necessary to its activities or economic survival. 
At the same time, sanctions may be intended to send a signal to a target or some 
other relevant constituency. The signalling aspect of sanctions is under-appreciated 
in the scholarly and policy literature on sanctions. Dismissing sanctions as ‘merely 
symbolic’ gestures fails to appreciate their role in the articulation and reinforcement 
of global norms. Sanctions impose costs on both the target and the sender, and back-
ing the rhetorical conviction of diplomatic condemnations with costs imposed on 
one’s own constituents is a powerful way to communicate norms. Sanctions also send 
signals to multiple constituencies, not only the target, but also other actors tempted 
to pursue similar policies. They can even be used as signals to prevent allies from es-
calating a conflict and resorting to the use of military force, as they were in the case of 
recent EU sanctions against Iran. 
These different goals are inter-related in complex ways. An asset freeze intended to 
coerce an individual to stop financing acts of terrorism can simultaneously be uti-
lised to constrain a group from being able to commit those acts. Constraining a rebel 
group’s access to resources to purchase arms can tip the balance on the battlefield and 
influence their calculations about a negotiated settlement of a conflict. If potentially 
imitating states see the stigmatising effects of signalling sanctions on their peers, they 
may be persuaded into compliance with burdensome treaty obligations.
Given that the goals of sanctions are multiple, their effectiveness in achieving those 
goals should be evaluated in analytically separate terms. If a sanction fails to coerce 
a change in the behaviour of the target, it is not necessarily a failure in policy. Sanc-
tions might succeed in constraining a target, in buying time for a negotiated settle-
ment, or in signalling resolve about a norm that has important implications for the 
policy behaviour of other parties. 
By differentiating the effectiveness of sanctions according to their purpose, the re-
search of the TSC has shown that sanctions intended to constrain or to signal tar-
gets are nearly three times as effective (27% of the time) as sanctions intended to 
coerce a change in behaviour (only 10% of the time).
Seven conditions for sanctions success
1. Pre-sanctions trade volumes need to be important for economic sanctions to bite
Sanctions on an entire economy or a sector of an economy can only coerce change 
or constrain targets when pre-sanction trade between the sanction-imposer and the 
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sanction target is important for the target. This means (a) that the lower the level of 
pre-sanction trade, the higher the probability of failure, and (b) that boycotts and 
embargoes of highly valued products that cannot be replaced, re-sourced or (re)sold 
have more impact. This is common sense, but all too often students of sanctions have 
overlooked this basic requirement. They either do not consider trade at all, do not 
measure trade linkages before the sanction is imposed or threatened, or consider only 
the development of bilateral trade (not taking potential trade diversion into account).
Figure 1 shows how the expected result of a sanction is linked to the amount of 
bilateral trade between sender and target as a percentage of the target’s GDP (meas-
ured in the year before the sanction is imposed). Clearly when trade linkage is low, 
failures to coerce a change in behaviour exceed successes by far. Once proportional 
trade linkage is above 10%, the rate of success is almost 50%, a strong improvement 
of the 33% success rate observed for all sanctions. 
Figure 1: Trade linkages and sanctions success                               
Sources for data: calculations based on Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International 
Trade (Edward Elgar, 2009). The primary data set for the outcome of sanctions is the Peterson Institute sanction 
database.
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2. Sanctions tend to succeed most in the initial years of implementation
Adjustment by the target reduces the potential impact of economic sanctions. Here 
two mechanisms operate. 
Firstly, a sanction implies that the pre-sanction pattern of international specialisa-
tion is no longer optimal and needs to be changed. This process of reallocation of 
labour and capital towards other sectors (e.g. from the export sector to the import 
sector) requires time. The longer the duration of the sanctions, the better the sanc-
tion target can adjust to the new situation. 
Secondly, during the adjustment process economic performance will improve. From 
a political economy perspective it is important that this creates the perception that 
the worst is over. Indeed, while economic activity will remain below pre-sanction 
levels, growth rates may be positive, fuelling the expectation that the sanctions can 
be overcome. 
Given that targeted countries tend to adjust their economies under sanctions, the 
potential sanction damage is largest before adjustment can undercut the (potential) 
costs of sanctions. 
Figure 2 illustrates the importance of duration. About 40% of the successes in 
changing behaviour occur in the first year of a sanction regime; a good 60% of the 
failure cases are characterised by duration in excess of three years.
Figure 2: Duration and sanction success/failure
Source: Sajjad Faraji Dizaji and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, ‘Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of eco-
nomic sanctions: A VAR approach with an application to Iran’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 50, no. 6, 2013, pp. 721-36.
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3. The psychological factor: expectations, credibility and strategic interaction play a major role
The actual application of sanctions is uncertain, and the very threat of sanctions 
can play a major role in changing target behaviour. A sanction does not only impose 
costs on the target, but also on the country that imposes the sanctions. After all, 
both countries have to forego the benefits of international trade. Therefore the ac-
tions and reactions of the actors involved need to be analysed comprehensively, and 
the analyst needs to deal with expectations. 
This implies, first of all, that we need to acknowledge that the expected outcome ex 
ante may be different from the observed outcome ex post (for example, the target may 
think it unlikely that the sanction threat will actually be applied). 
Sanctions ‘bite’ most when they are unanticipated
Sanctions that are expected by the target give rise to activities that reduce their im-
pact, such as stockpiling, setting up import substitution, refocusing exports and 
imports on non-traditional markets and reducing dependency on foreign capital 
and trade in general. Unexpectedness can be achieved by contingency planning, 
short deliberations, quick implementation, the engagement of unexpected (non-
traditional) sanction imposers, and the use of instruments (new types of sanctions 
or restrictive measures) that have not been used before.
The threat of sanctions is more effective than the actual imposition of sanctions
Strategic interaction is an important element. Both target and sender have to con-
sider the implications of their behaviour for their reputation. A history of strong 
sanctions may enhance the sender’s reputation and make its threats more credible 
(it may, however, also provide incentives to future sanction targets to avoid having 
too close trading links with such a sender). Giving in to sanctions may reveal weak-
ness on the part of the target, and this may spill over to and have an adverse effect 
on other international negotiations.
The actual imposition of sanctions represents a failed strategy of bluffing on both 
sides. The target underestimates the resolve of the sender, while the sender is unable 
to persuade the target to weigh accurately the costs and benefits of changing behav-
iour. This is linked to the above insight about the short-term nature of sanctions 
effectiveness when it comes to efforts to coerce a change in behaviour. For example, 
the threat of international sanctions was reportedly an important factor in former 
Yemen President Saleh’s decision to step down from power in 2012, just as it played 
into the decision of President Kiir to sign the South Sudan peace agreement in 2015. 
The credibility of sanction threats can be enhanced by a track record of effective 
sanctions implementation. A threat of sanctions that is not followed up by actual 
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measures that bite undermines the credibility of the use of sanctions in future cases. 
This reputational consequence implies that the use of sanctions should be restrict-
ed to cases where the sanctions can be imposed, monitored and implemented. Like-
wise, sanctions that cannot be sustained, or for which the coalition imposing the 
sanctions is unstable, should be avoided.
Sanctions are less effective the higher the risk tolerance of targets
We also need to consider the risk tolerance of the sanction target leadership. Deci-
sion-makers are not risk neutral: sometimes the target is risk averse and sometimes 
the target has a risk preference and is willing to take the gamble even if the expected 
outcome is negative.
Sanctions against targets whose leadership has a short horizon of survival are less 
likely to succeed in changing target behaviour. A short time horizon is associated 
with more risky behaviour. Government officials who may have to fear for their lives 
if they comply with sanctions will show risk-taking behaviour in the sense that they 
may gamble that the sanctions will not be implemented (effectively). Targeted entities 
that are participating in a civil war may be thought to act irrationally if they do not 
give in under extreme economic pressure, but if no viable alternative exists, sanctions 
have a low probability of succeeding. Under these conditions, sanctions designed to 
constrain the target may be more appropriate, such as the travel bans and asset freez-
es imposed on individuals deemed responsible for war crimes or seen as a potential 
threat to the peace processes in Angola and Liberia in the 1990s and early 2000s.1 
‘Failed’ sanctions can create a new baseline for engagement with the target
The presentation of costs and benefits matters. People have different assessments of 
losses and benefits, even if they are relatively of equal magnitude. In cases where the 
‘stick’ (the threat of sanction damage) does not prove effective in bringing about a 
change in behaviour, the ‘carrot’ of incentives or positive inducements might suc-
ceed.  One reason for sanction implementation may thus be to create a new baseline. 
Lifting sanctions can then be framed in a positive way, as they have in the case of 
Iran. The same happened with Libya in the 1990s, when the promise of a suspension 
of sanctions triggered a diplomatic breakthrough.
Sanctions intended to send a signal to the target (or to others observing the sanc-
tions dynamic), often perform a stigmatising function. Most targets are not shamed 
by sanctions (in the sense of naming and shaming), because they tend not to share 
the norms being articulated by those sending the sanctions. They can, however, be 
stigmatised or isolated among some relevant communities by being sanctioned. 
Some of the individuals designated by the UN Security Council for their financing 
1. See Biersteker et. al., SanctionsApp, Angola, episode 3 and Liberia, episode 4, for details. Available online at: http://
www.sanctionsapp.com.
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of terrorism, were not shamed by their listing (because they viewed their cause as 
just), but they were shunned and stigmatised by their neighbours.
4. Sanctions are more likely to succeed if the target is more democratic (less authoritarian) 
Sanctions are mediated by political systems. The effectiveness of international sanc-
tions is often determined by the nature of the political system or political economy 
in place in the target state. Economic costs of sanctions cannot be assessed in a uni-
tary cost/benefit manner, but affect different communities and regions of the target 
country in different ways. 
The stronger the autocratic institutions vis-à-vis democratic institutions, the low-
er the opposition’s political effectiveness; sanctions will thus lead to stronger and 
more effective opposition in democracies as compared to autocracies. Authoritar-
ian regimes also have the capacity to distribute the losses (and gains) from sanc-
tions in ways that penalise their opponents and reward their supporters, thus of-
ten strengthening authoritarian rule in the process, as observed in Iraq during the 
1990s. 
The target’s institutional framework is not black and white: some countries are 
more authoritarian than other countries (as for example can be seen in the discus-
sions on Russia and Iran in chapters II and V respectively). Among authoritarian 
states personalist regimes and monarchies are also more vulnerable to sanctions 
than military regimes and single party states, because they have a track record of 
relying more heavily on external financial support.
Sanctions may strengthen rather than weaken popular support for the regime
An external threat may generate a ‘rally around the flag’ effect, as has been observed 
in Russia under sanctions (see chapter II). This is particularly the case when the tar-
get population approves of the behaviour that the sender is opposing and seeking to 
change. Targets of sanctions in authoritarian regimes often mobilise popular sup-
port through their control of the media and their ability to depict the sanctions as 
targeted not against the proscribed activities of the regime in power, but against the 
entire nation. Religiously motivated behaviour is thus difficult to change. Military 
activity to safeguard fellow nationals who are minorities in other countries can also 
count on strong popular support, as in Russia. In these cases, sanctions often fail 
to tip the balance.
Targets with a strong ideological motivation are almost impossible to coerce
Sanctions targets with a strong commitment to a political-economic ideology, to 
religious extremism, or targets engaged in a struggle for survival and self-determi-
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
25 
nation are difficult to coerce with sanctions. A change in their behaviour might un-
dermine the rationale or basis on which they rely for political legitimation, survival 
and support. As a result, they are willing and able to bear very high costs. 
Groups engaged in carrying out acts of terrorism that are highly resistant to at-
tempts at coercion, such as the al-Qaeda terrorist network, are more appropriately 
targeted with sanctions intended to constrain their activities rather than to force 
a change in their behaviour. The same applies to most targeted sanctions against 
non-state armed groups.
5. Strong multilateral political commitment makes sanctions more effective
Most sanctions regimes are the product not of unilateral decisions taken by a single 
state, but of collective decision-making within a multilateral institutional frame-
work. As such, the dynamics of decision-making, implementation, monitoring, and 
resolve are influenced by institutional factors.
The more multilateral the sanctions are, the fewer the options for sanctions evasion 
or trade diversion by the target. Moreover, sanctions imposed by universal member 
institutions like the United Nations have more international legitimacy than sanc-
tions imposed by a single state as an instrument of its foreign policy. Sanctions 
imposed by regional organisations of which the target is a member also have greater 
legitimacy than sanctions imposed by a regional organisation on third parties who 
are not members of the regional institution. 
Multilateral decision-making is not always based on a collective, unitary, consist-
ent or strategic logic. Rather, the text and content of many international sanctions 
enacted by international organisations is the product of negotiation, bargaining, 
separate bilateral deals, and side-payments. The texts of international sanctions res-
olutions often contain what diplomats refer to as ‘constructive ambiguity,’ which, 
although useful for negotiation purposes, can render the terms subject to multiple, 
and conflicting, interpretations. When sender ambiguity is visible to targets, targets 
are more likely to wait out the sanctions or to develop counter-strategies to sow dis-
sent among sender states, as Libya did by mobilising OAU and Arab League opposi-
tion to the implementation of UN sanctions in the 1990s. 
Political will is indicated by unanimity in sanctions resolutions, unambiguous texts, 
devoting resources to sanctions implementation, active monitoring and enforcement 
activities, and by a visible willingness by the senders to bear the costs of the measures. 
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6. Narrowly defined goals & multiple policy instruments increase success rate of sanctions 
Targets are more likely to comply with narrowly articulated goals – such as conven-
ing elections (DRC), turning over suspects (Libya in the 1990s), providing access to 
a disputed territory (Russia) – that give them some room for manoeuvre than to 
comply with multiple, vaguely defined, general goals (like improving the human 
rights situation in the territory under their control). 
The simultaneous application of other policy instruments, such as referrals to inter-
national legal tribunals, the application of other (regional) sanctions, and the intro-
duction of resource certification schemes, is also correlated with effective efforts to 
coerce a target to change their behaviour. Applying sanctions to an entire country is 
more effective than trying to limit them to a single territory or region of the coun-
try, due to the complexity of implementation of the measures by companies called 
upon to restrict their transactions to a targeted region.
Some cases, such as post-conflict situations handled by the UN over the last two 
decades, show that an even more fine-tuned strategy can effectively constrain tar-
geted actors. When the UN tries to stay neutral and avoids taking sides in a conflict, 
as it often does when it first becomes involved, its sanctions (typically imposed on 
‘all parties to a conflict’) tend to be ineffective. 
After a peace settlement is negotiated, and the UN uses sanctions to constrain one 
party (potential spoilers to the transitional arrangement), the sanctions have a 
higher probability of effectiveness. Since virtually all international sanctions today 
are targeted, focusing on key regime supporters and core family members is more 
important than focusing directly on the political leadership of the regime. When 
appropriate, cutting off access to sources of revenue (diamonds, timber, oil, diverted 
charitable donations) is highly effective in constraining targets, as seen in the cases 
of Liberia and Sierra Leone.
When only one type of targeted sanction is imposed in isolation, it is never effective 
Based on the data accumulated by the TSC for UN sanctions, imposing a single type 
of sanction in isolation (an arms embargo or a travel ban, for example), is never effec-
tive. On average, the simultaneous application of at least three (and closer to four) 
different types of targeted sanctions is necessary for effective coercion, constraint or 
signalling. 
The most common combination of targeted sanctions imposed by the UN is an arms 
embargo, travel ban, and an asset freeze. When commodity sanctions are added to the 
mix, as they frequently are in the African conflict cases (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia), the effectiveness of such measures tends to increase. Sanctions effectiveness 
is also associated with simultaneous use of other policy instruments (threats of force, 
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
27 
use of force, peacekeeping operations, legal referrals to international tribunals, covert 
operations, and sanctions imposed by more than one organisation). 
7. ‘Targeted’ sanctions can be as effective as comprehensive sanctions
Even though they invariably affect fewer people and have lower humanitarian con-
sequences, targeted sanctions, on average, do not appear to be significantly less ef-
fective than comprehensive sanctions.  The aggregate figures of the effectiveness of 
63 cases of UN targeted sanctions from the TSC suggest an average of 22%, as op-
posed to the Peterson Institute for International Economics data that suggest 33% 
for all types of sanctions (comprehensive and targeted). 
This has implications for the debate about how to strengthen sanctions. It suggests 
that there are different ways to bolster sanctions – both a widening (to additional 
segments of the population) or a deepening (applying secondary sanctions to evad-
ers). Public discourse tends to equate strengthening with widening, not deepening, 
the measures, but secondary sanctions on evading parties tend to be under-utilised. 
In the final analysis, sanctions can be effective, even when targets prove resistant 
to changing their behaviour. There are situations in which sanctions communicate 
a strong signal to other parties to avoid embarking on a proscribed policy activ-
ity. This applies particularly to the non-proliferation sanctions regime. While the 
sanctions imposed on individual countries to cease their ‘weaponisation’ of nuclear 
programmes have not always yielded success, other countries contemplating similar 
programmes have been deterred from embarking on them. Thus, while the sanc-
tions may have failed at one level, they have succeeded at another. 
Collateral damage as a result of broad-based sanctions is inevitable
Opponents of sanctions often point out secondary or unexpected outcomes of 
sanction cases, drawing principally on the case of comprehensive sanctions against 
Iraq in the 1990s. Collateral damage occurs in terms of health (including lower life 
expectancy, increased child mortality and contagious diseases), education (reduced 
spending and completion rates) suppression of minorities, and effects on the gen-
der division of labour. A deterioration of human rights situations has also been 
documented, as have increases in corruption and a legacy of criminality once sanc-
tions are lifted (because networks originally established to evade sanctions can be 
utilised to engage in criminal activities – as seen in the former Yugoslavia). While 
these effects appear and often are unintended, they are not unexpected. Indeed a 
large body of literature exists that clarifies that economic slow-downs, such as reces-
sions, leave their marks on these important determinants of individual well-being 
– and comprehensive economic sanctions contribute to (and are mostly intended 
to) slow down an economy.
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Conclusion: ending sanctions remains difficult
Ending unsuccessful sanctions is difficult. The sanctions have been imposed because 
the target behaves in a way that is deemed unacceptable. If the sanctions do not 
change that behaviour or constrain the target, there is no logical reason to end the 
sanctions. Typically the ending of such sanctions needs a change of government, 
often in the sanction target country, but sometimes also in the sanction sending 
country. A new leadership can set new rules of engagement and this may offer an 
opportunity to reevaluate the utility of economic sanctions that are still in place. 
Monitoring the impact of sanctions, especially of their unintended consequences, 
may provide arguments to review the sanction regime.
Ending successful sanctions looks straightforward but in reality it is also compli-
cated. Sanction goals may be adjusted over time or be only partially met. Still, for 
sanctions to work, the commitment to lift sanctions and transparency about the 
conditions under which this will be done needs to be clear. The negotiation among 
senders over the sequencing of the suspension or lifting of sanctions has important 
consequences for both target and senders and can have significant benefits for those 
who first renew business activities with the targeted entity.
Failure to suspend or lift sanctions creates two problems for the senders of sanc-
tions. First, they place an administrative burden on sender states or institutions. 
The UN never had more than six or seven sanctions regimes in place at the same 
time during the 1990s. Today, the number has grown to sixteen simultaneous re-
gimes in place. Second, failure to lift sanctions after the situation changes under-
mines the legitimacy of sending institutions and makes it more difficult for them to 
secure compliance by others.
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II. THE IMPACT OF EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
Richard Connolly
Introduction
In the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 
and its involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the EU, the US and their al-
lies imposed a series of sanctions on Russia. This chapter focuses on the impact of 
these sanctions on the Russian economy and the implications these effects have for 
Russia’s political system.1 The economically most important sanctions include a 
ban on loans of a maturity of longer than one month, a ban on investments in new 
energy projects, and a ban on arms sales to Russia. This chapter also briefly dwells 
on how Moscow’s counter-sanctions on Western food imports have impacted on 
the Russian economy.
There has been a range of varying estimates of the economic impact of Western 
sanctions. In November 2014, Russia’s Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, suggested 
that sanctions had cost Russia $40 billion. More recently, President Putin stated 
that sanctions have cost Russia $160 billion. Outside Russia, numerous politicians 
have also assigned great importance to the effect of sanctions on the performance 
of the Russian economy.
However, estimating the impact of economic sanctions on the Russian economy over 
the past year is fraught with difficulty. In addition to the methodological challenges 
inherent to any such exercise under even ‘normal’ conditions, the performance of 
the Russian economy over the past 12 months has also been affected by additional 
complicating factors that extend well beyond the imposition of sanctions. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of 
the economic context against which sanctions have been imposed. The next sec-
tion examines the direct impact of sanctions on those sectors targeted by Western 
sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions. The third section examines the effects 
of Western sanctions on the Russian domestic political economy. The final section 
summarises the key findings. 
 
1. Editor’s note: this chapter focuses on the economic impact of sanctions on Russia and on important spill-over ef-
fects that these have had on the domestic political economy. The aim of this chapter is to help establish whether the 
sanctions are likely to create conditions under which the Russian government might change policy in Ukraine, which 
was the initial rationale of these sanctions.
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Context matters: slowing economic growth and the collapse 
in the oil price
An accurate assessment of the impact of sanctions requires that the ceteris paribus 
– ‘all other things being equal’ – condition be satisfied. However, in 2014, all other 
things in the Russian economy were far from equal. It is important to be aware 
of two highly significant factors that influenced the performance of the Russian 
economy at the time that sanctions were imposed. 
Figure 1: Real GDP, 2006–14, percentage change from previous quarter
Source for data: Rosstat (August 2015) 
First, Russia was already in the grip of a slowing economy that was drifting towards 
stagnation even before the imposition of sanctions. This slowdown is structural in 
nature and has been exerting a negative influence on a number of key economic 
indicators for some time now. Second, the dramatic decline in oil prices over the 
second half of 2014 was of profound importance to a country that was, in 2013, the 
world’s second largest producer and exporter of oil. 
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Figure 2: Rouble-dollar exchange rate and oil price (Brent, $), 2013–15
Source for data: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (June 2015)
The structural slowdown in economic growth in Russia and the decline in the 
price of oil both make it difficult to isolate the economic impact of sanctions. To 
illustrate this point, consider the dramatic depreciation of the rouble, Russia’s cur-
rency, in the final quarter of 2014.  Some commentators have suggested that this 
depreciation was caused at least partially by sanctions. It is, for example, intuitively 
appealing to suggest that sanctions may have led to a loss of business confidence 
in Russia, which in turn caused a rise in capital outflows, generating downward 
pressure on the exchange rate. However, closer inspection of the data reveals that 
daily fluctuations in the price of oil act as a more reliable predictor of rouble-dollar 
exchange rate movements: between January 2013 and May 2015, the correlation in 
movements between the two was almost perfect (Figure 2).  Thus, the single best 
explanation for the depreciation of the rouble is the slide in oil prices.
The simultaneous nature of the shocks affecting economic performance in Russia 
over the past year or so is highly significant from an analytical point of view. No 
single factor from the structural slowdown, the fall in oil prices, or the imposition 
of sanctions, can solely explain the country’s deteriorating economic fortunes over 
this period. Nevertheless, it should be clear from looking at the macro indicators 
presented above (GDP, exchange rate) that the immediate overall economic impact 
of sanctions has been relatively muted, at least when compared with the influence 
of the structural slowdown and falling oil prices.
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‘Direct’ effects of Western sanctions on economic 
performance in Russia
If the overall impact of economic sanctions appears modest, it is nevertheless plau-
sible that sanctions may have tangibly affected the targeted sectors. Western sanc-
tions were targeted at three main sectors – energy, defence and finance, while Rus-
sian counter-sanctions resulted in a one-year ban on imports of fruit, vegetables, 
meat, fish, milk and dairy products from all EU countries, as well as additional 
Western countries, including the USA. The impact of sanctions in each of these 
four sectors is discussed below. 
The defence industry
Defence industry production grew in 2014, despite sanctions, due to growing de-
mand from abroad and from domestic orders (i.e., due to the rise in procurement 
from the state armaments programme to 2020). 
The aggregate effect of the arms embargo on Russia is, however, modest due to the 
fact that only a small proportion of Western arms exports go to Russia, and a cor-
respondingly small proportion of Russian arms exports go to Western countries. As 
a result, despite the imposition of sanctions, Russia recorded well over $13 billion 
worth of arms exports in 2014, making Russia the world’s second-largest exporter 
of armaments. 
This healthy export performance was achieved while domestic orders also rose to 
high post-Soviet levels. As part of the state armament programme (GPV) to 2020, 
which aims to reequip and modernise Russia’s armed forces, military spending as 
measured by SIPRI has risen from 3.2% of GDP in 2000, to 4.5% in 2014. Of this, 
half was spent on procurement and research development (R&D). In 2015, military 
expenditure is expected to peak at 5.4%, with 60.5% of this amount earmarked for 
procurement and R&D. 
Notwithstanding such healthy production data, the arms industry has encountered 
some problems in implementing production orders because of the Ukraine crisis. 
Some of these problems have emerged not just as a result of Western sanctions, 
but also because of severed links with Ukrainian defence industry enterprises that 
were previously closely integrated with the Russian defence production network. 
The Ukrainian ban on arms exports to Russia has, for example, caused shortages of 
helicopter engines and power supply units for naval ships. The impact of Western 
sanctions has been felt in the form of reduced access to some components rather 
than final weapon systems. 
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The hydrocarbons sector
The impact of sanctions on current oil production has been negligible, with post-
Soviet record levels of oil production registered in 2014. This is because Western 
sanctions target projects oriented to future rather than current production. This 
has been done by the imposition of restrictions on technologies related to Arctic 
and deep-water exploration, as well as onshore tight oil extraction (e.g., from the 
giant Bazhenov formation).
The vast majority of Russia’s existing oil production comes from onshore depos-
its in Western and Eastern Siberia, both of which continue to yield large volumes 
of hydrocarbons. However, production from existing ‘brownfield’ deposits is ex-
pected to decline over the next decade. Unless massive investment in ‘greenfield’ 
deposits is undertaken – especially in the offshore deep-water, Arctic and tight oil 
deposits targeted by sanctions – declining production may not be replaced. As a 
result, sanctions should only be expected to affect Russian oil production over the 
medium term (i.e. 3-5 years). 
In addition to restrictions on equipment, many Russian energy producers have been 
blocked from accessing capital. This is important for two reasons. First, and as stat-
ed previously, continued production requires massive capital investment. Financial 
sanctions have created a clear mismatch between projected investment and avail-
ability of capital to fund it. Second, many Russian energy producers – not least the 
state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom – are highly leveraged, with high debt-revenue 
ratios, much of which is denominated in foreign currencies.    
Unable to refinance existing stocks of debt, targeted Russian energy companies have 
simply carried out scheduled repayments. Despite the decline in oil prices, foreign-
currency denominated revenues, as well as existing cash piles, have been used to 
finance these repayments. Some firms, such as Rosneft, have also tapped public for-
eign currency reserves (such as reserves managed by the Central Bank). Perhaps in a 
sign of financial distress, Rosneft is rumored to be considering opening credit lines 
with state-owned banks, as well as applying for access to the country’s sovereign 
wealth fund (NWF). It has also been suggested that Rosneft may sell a 19.7% share 
in the company to raise capital.
Inevitably, high debt servicing costs have reduced the availability of capital to fi-
nance investment, although the low price of oil has caused a retrenchment in capi-
tal investment across the global energy industry, and not just in Russia. 
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The financial sector
Financial sanctions have exerted the most observable influence over the Russian 
economy. Access to Western capital markets has been effectively closed to a large 
number of Russian corporations, and not just those directly targeted by sanctions. 
Firms in sectors directly targeted by sanctions – such as those in the energy, defence 
and construction industries – have suffered. But so have firms not directly sanc-
tioned, due to a ‘contagion’ effect as lenders became reluctant to lend to Russian 
firms because of fears that sanctions may be extended in the future.  
Figure 3: Quarterly net private capital flows, 2007–15 ($ billion)
Source for data: Central Bank of Russia, External Statistics Database (June 2015)
This has resulted in many Russian firms being forced to repay, rather than refinance, 
their external debt obligations, causing a significant rise in net private capital out-
flows and a reduction in the pool of capital available to fund investment in the wider 
economy (see Figure 3). Indeed, the size of capital outflows in 2014 was more severe 
than the ‘sudden stop’ of capital inflows that accompanied the recession of 2008-09. 
Total non-financial corporate (which includes many large state enterprises, such as 
Rosneft and Gazprom) and financial sector external debt fell from around US $715 
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billion (€650 billion) in January 2014 to $597 billion (€545 billion) at the end of 
2014. The total stock of external debt has declined due to a combination of repay-
ments (to Western banks), rescheduling of existing debt (to banks or other corpo-
rate entities that either own or are linked with the Russian debtors), or because of a 
reduction in the dollar value of rouble-denominated debt. 
The surge in private capital outflows, at least partially driven by external debt repay-
ments, contributed to the reduction in Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. It has 
been suggested that this threatens the financial stability of Russia because (a) Rus-
sia’s international reserves are not liquid enough to be used to meet external finan-
cial obligations; and (b) Russia’s foreign debt obligations in the near future exceed 
the stock of reserves. However, such claims are in all probability exaggerated. 
First, Russia’s reserves are liquid. Although a substantial share are held in gold or 
assigned to the two sovereign wealth funds – the Reserve Fund and the National 
Wealth Fund – both can be utilised by the authorities, if required. Indeed, it should 
be noted that the domestic spending obligations attached to the Reserve Fund and 
the National Wealth Fund are denominated in roubles. Consequently, domestic ob-
ligations could be met by simply instructing the Central Bank to print roubles to 
‘purchase’ their holdings of foreign exchange reserves.
Second, Russia’s external debt obligations are exaggerated by financial arrangements 
employed by Russian corporate groups, which result in a considerable amount of 
‘intra-group’ debt. These debts owed by subsidiaries to ‘parent’ companies are much 
softer loans than those taken out from Western banks. Indeed, many corporate 
groups have postponed payments on such debt. These intra-group debts account 
for nearly a quarter of Russia’s total stock of external debt (i.e., around $133 billion 
at the end of 2014). Moreover, intra-group debt repayments account for a propor-
tionately larger share of scheduled external debt payments over 2015 (55% of all 
scheduled repayments) and 2016 (42%). In addition, Russian corporations also hold 
significant cash reserves abroad (well over $100 billion).   
Third, as a country that consistently runs a large surplus on the current account of 
its balance of payments, Russia should be able to generate annual flows of dollar 
income in the region of at least 2-3% of GDP. 
Russia has been stretched by financial sanctions and has seen capital availability dwin-
dle. However, Russia has likely passed the peak of external finance pressure. Because 
increased access to capital from alternative sources (such as Asian capital markets) has 
not yet materialised, sanctioned Russian firms are now reorganising their financial ar-
rangements so that they rely more on domestic (usually state-owned) banks.
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Agriculture
The effects of Russian counter-sanctions in the agricultural sector can be examined 
both on the producer side (i.e., on Russian agricultural producers) and the consum-
er side (i.e., on the price and availability of food products to Russian consumers). 
Domestic producers of agricultural goods are seemingly well placed to benefit from 
the limitations imposed on Western producers. However, Russian producers tend to 
be weakest in those sectors where Western producers were most active such as pork 
and beef products, as well as specific categories of fruit and vegetables. As a result, do-
mestic production did not rise as dramatically as some initially hoped. In 2014, agri-
cultural production grew by 3.7%. Thus, domestic production has expanded, but only 
modestly. Instead, trade data reveal that substitutes for European products have been 
found in third countries, such as Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China and Turkey.
The reduction in imports from Western countries, and the costs associated with 
seeking new suppliers, has resulted in food prices rising above the average rate of 
consumer price inflation. Again, it is difficult to separate the impact of the food 
embargo from the rouble depreciation that has contributed to a wider rise in prices 
for all imported products (see Figure 4). It is also worth noting that historically it is 
not unusual for food prices to diverge from the headline rate of inflation. 
Figure 4: Consumer price index (CPI) and food (including restaurants) 
prices, 2010-2015 (year-on-year)
Source for data: Rosstat (July 2015)
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Impact on domestic political economy
To date, the evidence available from an analysis of the impact of sanctions imposed 
on Russia confirms the various hypotheses described in chapter I of this report. 
Different types of sanctions affect leaders and populations in different political sys-
tems in different ways, as highlighted in chapter I. In Russia’s political setting – an 
authoritarian regime – thus far, the Russian leadership has been successful in chan-
nelling resources to politically well-connected allies. Sanctioned individuals – such 
as the billionaires Gennady Timchenko and Arkady Rotenberg – have received ac-
cess to lucrative construction contracts, while systemically important firms, such as 
the state-owned oil giant, Rosneft, have successfully lobbied for access to financial 
resources from the government’s sovereign wealth fund.   
Not only can non-democratic regimes allocate scarce resources to allies of the in-
cumbent regime in order to strengthen elite cohesion, they are also able to redistrib-
ute resources to important socio-economic constituencies that will ensure popular, 
as well as elite, support for the regime. Indeed sanctions can create the conditions 
for the rise of powerful constituencies in the target nation that benefit from inter-
national isolation. This is because in the long run, sanctions often foster the de-
velopment of domestic industries in the target country, thus reducing the target’s 
dependence on the outside world and the ability of sender countries to influence the 
target’s behaviour through economic coercion.
The economic policy climate in Russia since the imposition of sanctions has em-
phasised support for just those industries that are targeted by sanctions. Import 
substitution – popular among only a minority before 2014 – is becoming increas-
ingly fashionable among policymakers and experts in Russia. The longer Russia is 
isolated from the global economy, as will happen the longer sanctions persist, the 
more likely it is that these forces will grow to dominate economic policymaking. 
Indeed, the interruption of supply chains has prompted a reallocation of resources 
to domestic industries through import-substitution programmes. 
Over the past year, extra resources have been allocated to the oil and gas equipment 
industry, the pharmaceutical industry, the agricultural machinery and production 
industries, and, of course, the military-industrial complex. All of these are key eco-
nomic constituencies that account for a large share of employment in Russia, and 
all are benefiting from friendly public policies implemented as a direct result of the 
imposition of sanctions. 
Finally, previous episodes of sanctions reveal that sanctions can also generate a ‘ral-
ly round the flag’ effect in target countries, in which sanctions lead to an increase 
in political cohesion within the target state. The imposition of sanctions enables 
targeted leaders to pinpoint a clear external threat, which can be used as a focal 
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point for a leader to unify the state. Leaders can also place the blame for economic 
hardship on the sender state rather than on their own economic policies, suggesting 
that sanctioned populations might rally against the enemy or sender state.
In Russia, there is strong evidence of such a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Not only do 
all opinion polls show that public support for the leadership is near record high levels 
– i.e., with the President consistently receiving over 80 percent approval ratings since 
March 2014 –  but the Western sanctions regime has also given the leadership a conven-
ient alibi for the structural downturn in the economy described earlier in this chapter. 2 
Without sanctions, it is possible that the leadership would have come under much 
greater public scrutiny for its poor stewardship of the economy. However, the lead-
ership has been able to assign blame for any economic hardship onto external en-
emies. On a broader level, there is also evidence that ‘standing up to the West’ has 
given many (although not all) Russian citizens a greater sense of pride in their coun-
try’s international standing. 
Conclusion
Although not insignificant, the economic impact of sanctions has been overshad-
owed by the impact of Russia’s own structural economic slowdown and the sharp 
and deep decline in oil prices that began in the summer of 2014. However, Russia’s 
overall financial position remains comparatively strong. 
The impact of sanctions has been most observable at the domestic political level. 
Because sanctions tend to affect non-democracies differently to democracies, the 
Russian leadership has been able to reallocate resources to its allies within the elite, 
and also to key economic constituencies across Russia. Under the mantra of import 
substitution, economic policy is taking an increasingly introverted and dirigiste turn. 
Nevertheless, this blend of economic nationalism has proven, to date, to be very 
popular among large swathes of the Russian population. 
Thus, with the economic impact of sanctions reduced by the factors outlined in this 
chapter, it is reasonable to question whether Western sanctions are having the effect 
that sender countries hoped. 
2. The Levada Centre Indices, available at: http://www.levada.ru/indeksy (accessed 20 August 2015).
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III. HAVE EU SANCTIONS CHANGED 
RUSSIA’S BEHAVIOUR IN UKRAINE?
Stanislav Secrieru
Introduction
In March 2014 the EU initiated a series of diplomatic and economic sanctions 
against Russia in reaction to its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The EU was not alone in rolling out a sanctions regime against Russia: 
the fact that the introduction of sanctions and their upgrade was coordinated 
with major international players, notably the US, Japan and Canada, has given the 
sanctions greater political and economic weight.  Furthermore the sharp fall in 
oil prices since June 2014 has intensified the effect of sectoral sanctions on Rus-
sia. Moscow has argued that sanctions will do little to change Russia’s stance on 
Ukraine, despite their palpable effect on Russia’s economy. 
The Kremlin’s rhetoric has, however, diverted attention away from Russia’s actual 
policy shifts in Ukraine. This essay argues that EU sanctions – enforced alongside 
those of the US and other allies – and the threat to implement more such ‘restric-
tive measures’, have tamed Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine, and reduced to some 
degree the Kremlin’s policy options.  
This chapter builds on an analytical model [see Sherr, 2013], which offers a three-
level approach to assess Russia’s power projection abroad. The three levels of 
analysis concern Russia’s strategic objectives with Ukraine, its operational goals on 
the ground in the conflict, and its tactical means. Distinguishing these three levels 
helps evaluate what the imposition of EU sanctions has changed or not changed 
in Russia’s approach towards Ukraine between March 2014 and June 2015. A de-
tailed chronology of events that helps illustrate the underlying analysis is pro-
vided in the timeline on pages 44-47.
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Unaltered: Russia’s strategic objectives in Ukraine  
The EU’s sanctions have not altered and are unlikely to modify Russia’s strategic 
objectives in Ukraine over the mid-term.
In the post-Soviet period Russia has pursued two sets of overriding strategic goals in 
Ukraine. These can be divided into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ objectives. 
Russia’s ‘positive’ agenda for Ukraine envisions a weak but functional client state. 
According to this logic, the Kremlin is the final arbitrator in the power struggle in 
Ukraine. It wields power primarily through politically connected business networks, 
mainly in the energy sector and in heavy industry. Full membership in Russian-led 
regional integration projects – such as the Eurasian Economic Union project – rep-
resents the external dimension of this ‘positive’ agenda for Ukraine.
Russia’s ‘negative’ agenda for Ukraine foresees a fractured and a dysfunctional state 
paralysed by internal infighting, with the Kremlin playing the role of indispensable 
peacebroker. ‘Negative’ strategic objectives involve hampering Ukraine’s efforts to 
build closer relations with the EU and NATO, and avoiding Ukraine acceding to 
membership in these two organisations. 
Until 2013 Moscow had alternated between its ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ agendas, de-
pending on developments in Ukraine. Russia was ready to push its ‘positive’ agen-
da as far as possible and had avoided going too far in its ‘negative’ one. As Russia 
moved to annex Crimea in 2014 and ignite war in Eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin’s 
preferences visibly swung towards the latter agenda. 
Nonetheless, EU sanctions have been part of a cumulative set of factors that have 
prevented Russia’s strategic objectives from being fully accomplished at times when 
Ukraine’s state was too weak to resist a multi-dimensional (military and non-mili-
tary) attack by Russia.  
Partially successful: hindering Russia’s operational goals 
Russia has been partially successful at the operational level since March 2014. In or-
der to advance its ‘negative’ strategic objectives, Moscow pursued several operation-
al goals: to seize parts of Ukrainian territory, to establish provisional authorities 
and military structures, to use the latter as a springboard for more small territorial 
gains, and to foster permanent destabilisation in other parts of the country. 
Russia hoped these factors combined would drain Ukraine’s limited resources and 
foment unrest against the central authorities in Kyiv. Success at the operational 
level would have created a setting for partial reintegration (excluding Crimea) of 
parts of Donbass into Ukraine, but on Russia’s terms.  Such a development would 
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have given birth to a strategically deadlocked Ukraine. The accord would have in-
cluded constitutional changes on the right for self-determination of other regions 
in Ukraine, further encouraging the unravelling of the Ukrainian state. The consti-
tutional proposals circulated in May-June 2015 by the self-proclaimed Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) confirm this conjecture. Russia has 
partly succeeded in weakening Ukraine. 
Nonetheless, Western sanctions have partially paid off as well. Sanctions were part 
of the effort to freeze the military conflict along the post-Minsk demarcation line 
agreed in September 2014. As they were adopted at critical junctures in the conflict 
on the ground, they have prevented Russia’s further military expansion in Ukraine. 
The second wave of sectoral sanctions in September 2014 stopped Russia’s offen-
sive against almost defenceless Mariupol.  The threat of new sanctions impeded 
the full legitimisation of the separatists’ political structures in Donbass: at the last 
moment, Russia refrained from recognising the results of the November 2014 ‘elec-
tions’ in DNR and LNR1.
Sanctions contributed to lifting Russia’s opposition to the deployment and expan-
sion of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM). Despite the mission’s slow-
ness in developing its capacities as neutral observer, it has been the only interna-
tional actor able to monitor the situation on the ground and to offer insights into 
the conflict that do not corroborate Russia’s propaganda. Hence OSCE SMM activ-
ity forced Russia to make more efforts to camouflage its troops surge in Eastern 
Ukraine in January-February 2015.
Sanctions have made Crimea’s absorption more expensive for Moscow, prompting 
Russia to divert state funds earmarked for other projects. The peninsula has turned 
out to be the region most dependent on federal budget transfers, along with the 
North Caucasus republics. As Russia confronted the substantial costs of its annexa-
tion of Crimea, the EU’s direct financial support and mobilisation of international 
funds (from the IMF and the World Bank) saved Ukraine from economic collapse.
Russia’s territorial gains in Eastern Ukraine have led to an operational dilemma 
for the Kremlin: what to do next with war-torn parts of Donbass (now cut off from 
Ukraine) for which Russia has no interest in assuming the financial burden?
1. Engaging in a subtle game of semantics, Moscow declared that it ‘respected’ the results of the elections while it did 
not recognise them.
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Relative tactical success and respite for Ukraine
The EU’s sanctions on Russia have been most effective at the tactical level. 
To mount concentrated and relentless pressure on Ukraine, Moscow has employed 
a variety of military, economic, political, legal, diplomatic, and information tools. In 
2014 Russia deployed (unmarked) troops to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, trained and 
armed locals and Russian volunteers, and denied Kyiv control over the Ukrainian-
Russian border in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (along a 409 km strip of land). 
Gazprom suspended gas deliveries to Ukraine for more than half a year. Among the 
first concerns of Russian-led rebels in the captured towns and cities of Eastern Ukraine 
was to turn off Ukrainian TV channels and switch exclusively to Russian ones. Not 
surprisingly, the fighting around TV transmission towers was particularly intensive. 
At the same time the Russian Federal Migration Service sabotaged Ukraine’s mili-
tary mobilisation by extending the visa-free stay in Russia of Ukrainian citizens of 
conscription age to more than 90 days. The Kremlin actively promoted the narrative 
of the Maidan as a ‘coup’ fomented in Kyiv and led by a far-right movement. Russia 
stressed its own peaceful intentions. This combination of tactics aimed to discourage 
the EU from providing support to Ukraine by portraying it as a failed state, and by 
undermining Ukraine’s efforts to rebuild state capacity.
The use of military force, in particular throughout 2014, represents the most de-
structive behaviour demonstrated by Russia in its approach to Ukraine. In that re-
gard, sanctions have been responsible for limiting the scale of Russia’s use of mili-
tary force in Ukraine. Sanctions partially worked as a deterrent in the short-term by 
raising the cost of military escalation (e.g. Mariupol in September 2014). The threat 
of more sanctions forced Russia to de-escalate in order to prevent the emergence of 
an intra-EU consensus on sanctions and/or to soften the scope of an imminent new 
wave of restrictive measures. The threat of sanctions may have not prevented the 
takeover of Debaltseve, a key railway transport hub, in February 2015, but ensured 
in the aftermath a relatively quiet few months on the front.  Deliberations in the EU 
in the spring of 2015 over further extension of sectoral sanctions are likely to have 
been among the factors that have forestalled a major military offensive in Donbass.
Judged through this tactical prism, sanctions have provided Ukraine with some 
breathing space before the next round of fighting. Thus, it was ’thanks’ to the EU’s 
sanctions that the Minsk negotiations and an imperfect ceasefire were made possi-
ble at all. Such moments of brief respite were essential for Ukraine to strengthen the 
core structures of its state (notably its defence sector and security services), which 
was previously deeply infiltrated by Russia. Ukrainian state performance remains 
weak in terms of governance, but sanctions against Russia bought invaluable time 
for Ukraine to elect a new political leadership, buttress its defences and become 
more resilient than it was at the beginning of the conflict. Russia’s failed assault 
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on Marinka in June 2015 appears to reflect Ukraine’s improved military capabili-
ties. Today, Russia would have to significantly step up its use of violence to alter 
Ukraine’s defence lines. This would in all likelihood trigger more painful economic 
sanctions by the EU and its partners.
Conclusions
The EU’s decision to extend sectoral sanctions against Russia until January 2016 
has been an investment in its reputation as a credible sanctioning actor and coher-
ent foreign policy player. Sanctions have certainly not reversed the annexation of 
Crimea nor prevented Russia from waging a hybrid war in Ukraine. The slow pace 
at which the EU has scaled up sanctions has put it at a disadvantage in the face of a 
more agile and determined Russia. 
EU restrictions have increased the costs to Russia of its annexation of Crimea. They 
have constrained Russia’s ability to pursue its strategic objectives in Ukraine and 
limited its use of military instruments. In this regard, sanctions have provided a 
minimum of deterrence against Russia. 
Sanctions have helped Ukraine’s political regime to survive in the short term and 
mid-term. Yet without a concerted and ongoing effort on the part of the EU to as-
sist Ukraine with its programme of political and economic reform and on the part 
of Ukraine to pursue reforms (thus addressing more effectively the preconditions 
that facilitated Russia’s aggression), the positive payoff of sanctions for Ukraine 
may not last.
44 
ISSReportNo.25
Timeline of events in Eastern Ukraine & Crimea: military action, ceasefires 
and sanctions
· 27 February 2014: pro-Russian militias and Russian regular troops wear-
ing no identifying insignia seize the building of the Crimean parliament and 
erect security checkpoints between continental Ukraine and the Black Sea 
peninsula. The local legislative votes down the government and installs a new 
prime minister. In the following days Russia reinforces its troops, and blocks 
Ukrainian ground forces and navy in Crimea. The parliament in Simferopol 
schedules a ‘plebiscite’ on accession to Russia. 
· 3 and 6 March 2014: the EU decides on first measures against Russia. Prepa-
rations for the G8 summit to be held in Sochi, Russia, are suspended. Other 
bilateral policy processes such as the EU-Russia visa dialogue and talks on a 
new comprehensive economic and political accord with Russia are put on ice. 
EU heads of state task EU institutions to work on a first round of sanctions 
against individuals seen as responsible for the violation of Ukraine’s territo-
rial integrity. 
· 18 & 20 March 2014: after the ‘referendum’ in Crimea, a treaty of accession 
of Crimea to Russia is signed and ratified in Russia. 
· 16 and 21 March 2014: the EU adopts a first list of sanctions against 33 Rus-
sian and Ukrainian citizens (visa bans and assets freezes). The EU cancels a 
planned EU-Russia summit in spring 2014. EU capitals agree to limit the 
number of high-level bilateral meetings with Russia. Russia is expelled from 
the G8 group. Western states block ongoing negotiations on Russia’s acces-
sion to the OECD and International Energy Agency.  
· March 2014: in parallel to the annexation of Crimea, Russia foments pro-
tests across Southern and Eastern Ukraine (in and around Kharkiv, Donetsk, 
Luhansk, Odessa) against the new authorities in Kyiv. In the same month the 
EU Council instructs the EU Commission to prepare a new set of targeted 
measures. 
· 21 March 2014: in response to the growing instability, OSCE members decide 
to deploy a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, whose mandate 
has been extended several times since then. The Mission itself has expanded 
from 100 to around 500 civilian observers. 
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· April 2014: pro-Russian protests become more violent, though only a small 
number of persons are involved. Attacks on administrative buildings intensify 
(e.g. Luhansk and Donetsk on 7 April), whereas a first group of towns fall 
under the control of Russian-led militias (e.g. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on 
12 April). 
· 15 April 2014: Ukrainian authorities launch the so-called Anti-Terror Opera-
tion (ATO). 
· 17 April 2014: the heads of the United States, European Union, Russian and 
Ukrainian diplomacy meet in Geneva and agree on steps to de-escalate ten-
sions and restore order in Ukraine. 
· May 2014: pro-Russian militias seize more territory in Eastern Ukraine and 
evict Ukrainian border guards from the Russian-Ukrainian border. 
· 11 May 2014: in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk region, ‘referendums’ are 
held on the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peo-
ples Republics (DNR and LNR). 
· 12 May 2014:  the EU scales up individual sanctions and warns Russia against 
disrupting presidential elections in Ukraine scheduled for 25 May. 
· 6 June 2014: leaders of Germany, France, Russia and the newly elected presi-
dent of Ukraine Petro Poroschenko discuss ways to defuse the crisis at a meet-
ing in Normandy. A Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine is set up, composed 
of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE representatives. 
· 18 June 2014: after reestablishing partial control over the border with Rus-
sia and recapturing towns (e.g. Mariupol), President Poroshenko proposes a 
peace plan, and on 20 June declares a unilateral 7-day ceasefire. On 23 June, 
representatives of DNR and LNR agreed on the ceasefire. 
· 23 June 2014: the EU imposes a ban on import of goods from Crimea. 
· 27 June 2014: the EU threatens more sanctions. 
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· 1 July 2014: after multiple violations of the ceasefire by pro-Russian fighters, 
Ukraine re-launches ATO, which involves efforts to regain control over parts 
of Donbass and of its eastern border with Russia. In response, Russia ramps 
up heavy weapons supplies to the conflict zone. 
· 16 July 2014: the EU’s new sanctions aim to curb the financing of projects in 
Russia by the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the EU Commission. 
· 17 July 2014: flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur is shot down 
over the separatist rebel-controlled territory in Eastern Ukraine, killing all 
298 people on board. 
· 24 July 2014: OSCE members agree to send an observation mission to Rus-
sian checkpoints (Gukovo and Donetsk) at the border with Ukraine. 
· 25 & 29 July 2014: the EU tightens sanctions against individuals, and adopts 
economic sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, arms trade and tech-
nologies transfers in the military and oil sectors. The EU further restricts 
trade and investment with Crimea in several sectors (30 July 2014).
· August 2014: by mid-August the Ukrainian forces substantially reduce the 
area controlled by Russian-led fighters. To prevent the total collapse of the 
DNR and LNR, Russia delivers more heavy weapons and regular troops to 
Eastern Ukraine. By the end of August, Ukraine loses control of the bor-
der with Russia along the Donbass region, rebels break the encirclement of 
Donetsk and Luhansk, defeat Ukrainian forces at Ilovaisk and advance along 
the Azov Sea coast towards the strategic seaport of Mariupol.                  
· 5 September 2014: following several meetings of the Trilateral Contact 
Group on Ukraine its parties sign the so-called ‘Minsk protocols’. These in-
clude an immediate ceasefire clause. 
· 8 September 2014: the EU Council deepens sectoral sanctions against Russia. 
· October to December 2014: the intensity of fighting in Donbass decreases 
relatively. The hottest spot on the frontline remains Donetsk airport. 
· 2 November 2014: DNR and LNR hold ‘general elections’. 
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· 28 November 2014: the EU expands its list of sanctioned individuals in East-
ern Ukraine. 
· 18 December 2014: the EU introduces a comprehensive ban on investments 
in Crimea, prohibits the provision of tourist services, and forbids exporting 
technologies or equipment in the telecommunication, transport and energy 
sectors.
· 21 January 2015: pro-Russian fighters capture the ruins of Donetsk airport 
and mount an offensive on Debaltseve with support of Russian troops. 
· 29 January 2015: the EU takes the political decision to extend its sanctions 
on individuals until September 2015. 
· 12 February 2015: a new package of peace measures is agreed in Minsk af-
ter high-level talks in the so-called Normandy format. The OSCE was given a 
prominent role in monitoring the armistice. 
· 16 February 2015: the EU adds more people and organisations to its black-
list. The list includes 150 persons and 37 organisations or companies. 
· 18 February 2015: Russian-led forces capture the town of Debaltseve. 
· 13 March 2015: the EU extends its restrictive measures on individuals until 
15 September 2015.
· March - May 2015: the intensity of fighting visibly subsides. 
· 3-4 June 2015: Pro-Russian forces launch an attack on Marinka in the 
Donetsk region which is repelled by Ukrainian troops. 
· 19 and 22 June 2015: the EU extends its prohibitive measures on Crimea 
until 23 June 2016 and its sectoral economic sanctions on Russia until 31 
January 2016.
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IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN – A PRELIMINARY 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk
Introduction
This chapter seeks to contribute to the academic and policy debates on the merits of 
sanctions against Iran by providing an empirical analysis of their economic impact.1 
It starts by taking a look at stylised facts2 in order to establish whether sanctions 
are effective – measured by the degree to which they have constrained the Iranian 
authorities’ ability to sustain their ambitions in the nuclear field as a result of the 
costs sanctions have inflicted on the country. Having established the conditions 
under which sanctions meet the criteria for success (as developed in chapter I), the 
rest of the chapter explores the results of an econometric model that not only tracks 
the economic mechanisms through which sanctions operate, but also analyses their 
spillover effects in the political realm.
The Iranian case meets the economic requirements for success
The Iranian case would a priori seem to meet the underlying conditions under which 
sanctions should have a significant economic impact. Among them we can identify 
a sufficient level of pre-sanctions trade linkage between senders and the target coun-
try, combined with limited capabilities to substitute import and export products, 
as well as an unexpected broadening of the sanctions imposed and the use of a new 
tactic, namely the exclusion of Iran from the SWIFT worldwide messaging system. 
Trade sanctions
One of the most robust pre-conditions determining the degree to which sanctions 
have a significant economic impact is through the levels of pre-sanctions trade link-
ages. Figure 1 primarily shows that there was a significant level of pre-sanctions 
trade openness. Moreover, trade between Iran, the EU and the US covered some 
1. Editor’s note: This analysis is an ex ante assessment of the effects of sanctions on Iran and the likelihood of their 
success. It is based on economic modelling. The analysis, building and expanding on a paper co-authored with Sajjad 
Dizaji (2013), was undertaken before the July 2015 agreement between the E3+3 powers and Iran on the country’s 
nuclear programme. At the time of writing of this report in July 2015, it turns out that this model has proven highly 
predictive. The analysis offered in this chapter offers powerful insights into the dynamics of sanctions. 
2. This term, originally devised by the economist Nicholas Kaldor, refers to broad insights and deductions derived from 
empirical analysis of  the behaviour of a set of economic variables. 
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18% of Iran’s total export earnings. Between 2011 and 2013 (the 2013 numbers still 
being estimates), both trade ratios decreased by about four percentage points or a 
14-18 % decrease. This is in line with Iran’s 2010/11 export-to-GDP ratio of 21% and 
the share of the EU and US in Iran’s exports of 18% (these ratios in combination 
imply that trade at risk is 3.8% of Iran’s GDP). Figure 1 also shows the substantial 
decrease in Iranian overall trade, pointing to the possibility that sanctions may have 
contributed to this trade contraction. Given that exports are dominated by oil and 
that this specific product cannot be used as substitute for the import of capital 
goods, commodities and food, the effects of the imposed oil embargo are exacer-
bated. The reduction in oil export revenue as a result of the oil embargo spills over, 
first to the government budget and next to private consumption and investment.
Figure 1: Trade to GNP ratios for Iran (1995-2012 
and estimates and forecasts for 2013-2020)
Sources for data: GDP, exports and imports at constant 2000 prices and dollars for 1995-2007 are from World Bank, 
World DataBank, http://databank.worldbank.org  (accessed December 2012) and calculated from their real growth 
rates for 2008-13 as reported and estimated in IMF, April 2015 World Economic Outlook database (accessed May 
2015)
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Financial sanctions
The EU and US financial sanctions that accompanied the oil boycott may explain why 
the sanctions are biting much harder than expected – on the basis of pre-sanctions 
trade patterns. One of the measures taken within the EU’s financial sanctions 
package was to exclude Iran from the SWIFT worldwide messaging system, which 
is used to arrange international money transfers. This makes it significantly harder 
to process international payments, while simultaneously constraining other bilateral 
economic flows. Most importantly, the financial sanctions imposed are characterised 
by their unexpected scale (concretely through the involvement of the EU); while Iran’s 
exclusion from SWIFT is a measure that was used for the first time in history, and 
thus represents a new and innovative step. 
Economic dimension: key findings
· Pre-sanction trade linkage was substantial.
· Substitution possibilities between exported and imported products remain 
limited.
· Scale of the trade and investment sanctions was unexpected.
· SWIFT sanctions were unexpected.
These four key findings do not imply that the sanctions regime will succeed in 
achieving its stated goal – but rather that the expected likelihood of sanctions hav-
ing a significant economic impact is rather high. 
The political economy of sanctions
While the economic analysis suggests that sanctions are likely to have an important 
economic impact, we need to dig deeper into the knock-on effects brought about by 
restrictive measures from a political economy perspective.
Sanctions goals
First, it is important to note that the formally stated goal of the sanctions regime 
against Iran is to halt its nuclear programme, due to the suspicion that it is not be-
ing developed for peaceful purposes. As a result, it is important to check if the exist-
ing cases of sanctions regimes to enforce non-proliferation are statistically different 
from other sanctions regimes in general. After all, if it is more difficult to enforce 
non-proliferation, then we need to discount this in our assessment of the likelihood 
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that sanctions will succeed in constraining or prompting a behavioural change on 
the part of the target. 
The Peterson dataset lists 21 sanctions regimes that aim to change nuclear policies. 
Six cases are successful (28%): it should be noted that the median duration for suc-
cesses and failures are 1-4 years, respectively. Additional testing with a probability 
model that takes into account controlling factors such as trade linkage, duration, 
political stability and sender reputation, does not find a statistically significant dif-
ference for non-proliferation sanctions regimes [van Bergeijk, 2009]: the non-prolif-
eration cases can thus be analysed as if they were general sanction episodes.
Many commentators have linked sanctions to democratisation and in the Iran 
case perhaps this is an even more important goal for some of the current sender 
countries. Indeed, sanctions also appear to have been implemented with the hope 
of facilitating a democratic breakthrough in the target country. The implication is 
that the non-proliferation cases can be analysed and sanctions episodes aimed at 
strengthening democracy. This is yet another reason to focus our discussion below 
on the political changes in Iran.
Interest groups and regime change
The second issue to be noted is that we need to qualify the implicit assumption 
of a rational unitary actor – one that makes a cost-benefit analysis for society as a 
whole and acts accordingly. This is rather simplistic. The ‘public choice’ approach to 
economic sanctions in which interest group competition and political institutions 
are an important determinant of the impact of sanctions focuses attention on the 
extent to which sanctions hurt the supporters of the target government directly or 
compromise that government’s ability to reward supporters or, alternatively, sup-
press opposition. A body of empirical research shows a direct link between oil rev-
enue and government expenditure, especially regarding military spending.
The strength of the economy has been associated with the likelihood that the tar-
get’s leadership will survive. Typically growth slowdowns are associated with higher 
political turnover. Sanctions may either help to replace the target country’s govern-
ment or open up a bargaining range, making the target country’s leadership more 
willing to compromise due to the increasing political costs of not complying (i.e. a 
higher likelihood of government turnover). The key point is that the variations in 
economic wealth resulting from the imposition of sanctions matters empirically. 
Figure 2 takes a closer look at the evolution of this sanctions effect, bringing the 
growth and decline of GDP per capita as well as an index for democratisation into one 
picture. The simultaneous reduction of per capita income and the extent of democracy 
are remarkable, even if the causal relation could be deemed tentative at best. 
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Figure 2: Development of GDP per capita (growth rate) 
and Vanhanen index of democracy
Sources for data: IMF World Economic Outlook database (April 2015) and Tatu Vanhanen, Measures of Democracy 
1810-2012 [computer file]. FSD1289, version 6.0 (2014-01-31). Tatu Vanhanen & Krister Lundell, [data collection]. 
Tampere: Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor], 2014.
From this we can infer that sanctions have adversely affected the middle class. The 
imposed sanctions created hardship and may have been one of the important mo-
tivating forces behind the 2013 democratic change of leadership that brought Rou-
hani to power. In our discussion we fortunately do not have to answer the question 
of whether the sanctions actually caused this shift. What matters is that sanctions 
have a better chance of succeeding in more democratic targets.
Political dimension: key findings
• The sanctions did not generate support for the existing regime (no rally 
around the flag effect).
• Very significant  increase in democracy index.
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Modelling economics and politics
In order to shed light on the causal mechanisms, a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model 
for Iran is used. A VAR model is based on the historical evolution of the data rather 
than on some preconceived theory and is able to capture the dynamics of an economy. 
Our model ably describes the history (1959-2006) of both key economic variables (oil 
and gas rents, government consumption, imports, gross capital formation, GDP) as 
well as political variables that either measure the autocracy-democracy dimension 
(the so-called Polity IV indicator) or the Vanhanen index, that measures political com-
petition and participation. We estimate the VAR model on the basis of annual data 
for the period 1959-2006. In this model a shock is introduced in the economic system 
that mimics the sanctions and thus offers a prediction of sanction outcome. 
Figure 3: Sanction impact on GDP, imports and investment in Iran
Source for data: Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013, Generalized impulse responses - statistical appendix appendix (internet 
resource available at : http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/50/6/721/suppl/DC1)
Economic variables
The blue lines represent the impulse response functions (first graph for GDP, second 
for imports and third for investment). The patterns of the economic impulse response 
functions are similar: a negative and initially large impact that becomes larger in size 
up to the third year after the sanction shock is administered and then becomes smaller 
as the economy adjusts.3
3. Note that the red lines report the confidence interval’s upper and lower bounds; the negative impact is thus only 
significant in the first three years - that is, until the upper bound crosses the horizontal axis.
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Political variables
Figure 4 reports the key findings for the variables of interest: the impact of sanctions 
on political outcomes in Iran. The left-hand panel in Figure 4 focuses on the impact 
of the sanctions on the extent of democratisation; a positive impact implies that the 
sanctions stimulate democracy. The right-hand side panel in Figure 4 reports on 
the Polity IV indicator that measures Iran’s location on the democracy-autocracy 
continuum. An increase in these two measures is associated with more democratic 
(less autocratic) outcomes. The two approaches show similar results, thus giving us 
some confidence in the robustness of the findings: an initially significant positive 
shock that turns negative after six to seven years. While the shift towards more de-
mocracy is reflected by the 2013 elections, it is too early to tell if the model’s predic-
tion of a turnaround in 2017-18 is on track.
Figure 4: Sanction impact on index of democracy and polity-IV
Source for data: Dizaji and van Bergeijk, 2013, Generalized impulse responses - statistical appendix (internet resource 
available at http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/50/6/721/suppl/DC1)
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Key findings
• The impact of an oil boycott on the Iranian economy is considerable: oil and 
gas rents are important drivers of key macroeconomic variables (GDP, imports 
and investments) and ultimately of its political system. 
• A reduction of oil and gas rents creates economic costs that act as incentives to 
move towards a more democratic setting. 
• In the first two years, sanctions have a significantly positive impact, but the 
VAR model predicts that this effect wanes and in the long run the political ef-
fect of sanctions is negative.
A final note on the phasing-out of sanctions
Adjustment of the economy does not only reduce the negative impact of sanctions. 
It also reduces the direct benefits of terminating the sanctions regime. This is a logi-
cal consequence emanating from a lowering of the economy’s dependence on inter-
national trade (more autarky). While this does not influence the long-run free trade 
benefits, the fact that the economy needs to re-adjust implies costs that should be dis-
counted properly. Again, the implication is that the sanctions can only help to soften 
the Iranian position in the short run. Long-term sanctions against Iran, in contrast, 
may run counter to the cost-inducing effects of the initial years of implementation.
Summary of key findings
• Theory and empirical evidence lead to the conclusion that the economic im-
pact of sanctions on the Iranian economy is considerable.  
• Sanctions create economic costs that act as incentives to move toward a more 
democratic system. 
• This effect is only significant in the first two years and turns negative after 6-7 
years due to economic adjustment. 
• Increasing global pressure will initially cause effective damage pushing for 
more democracy or less autocracy and thereby leading to a softening of the 
Iranian negotiation position.
• In the long run, sanctions, however, are likely to have the opposite effect. In 
this sense sanctions have created a window of opportunity, but it is impor-
tant to realise that this window is likely to close if  the sanctions regime is 
prolonged.
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V. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: WINNERS AND LOSERS 
Sara Bazoobandi
Introduction 
Iran has been subject to sanctions for more than three decades. The United States 
(US) has been the primary sanctioning power since the Tehran US embassy seizure 
and hostage crisis in 1979. Since then Washington has expanded the range of puni-
tive measures taken against Iran in response to government actions deemed repre-
hensible by the White House. After the hostage crisis of 1979, the aggressive tactics 
of the Iranian military in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran’s sup-
port for terrorist organisations, and most recently, the revelation of the country’s 
nuclear programme, the US has essentially relied on ‘restrictive measures’ as an al-
ternative to military action to signal its disapproval. The European Union emerged 
as a primary sanctioning actor alongside the US after 2006, incrementally broaden-
ing its panoply of sanctions since then, and adopting so-called ‘autonomous’ sanc-
tions since 2010.
While the escalation of unilateral and international sanctions has had an adverse 
effect on the Iranian economy over the past few decades, the latest international 
campaign to impose extensive sanctions in response to Iran’s nuclear programme 
has had a much greater impact. 
This chapter will review two dimensions relating to the international sanctions re-
gime against Iran. Firstly, it will elucidate the reasons why the latest round of sanc-
tions has had a more pronounced negative impact on the country, and, secondly, it 
will evaluate their repercussions on Iran’s domestic politics.
In answering the first question, it is important to examine what made the most 
recent round of sanctions different from the sanctions which preceded them. Look-
ing at post-2006 sanctions on Iran, two key issues can be identified: the US’s rela-
tive success in persuading most of Iran’s key economic partners, both in Europe 
and Asia, to join the sanctions regime, and the Iranian government’s record of mac-
roeconomic mismanagement. A combination of these two phenomena has clearly 
been the key driver behind the greater impact of the most recent round of sanc-
tions. With regard to the second question, an assessment of the domestic political, 
economic and social impact will serve to evaluate the effect of sanctions and how 
the Iranian authorities have responded to the economic and societal pressures that 
these have generated.
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Post-2006 sanctions: a global economic campaign against Iran
Since 2006, the EU has joined the US in incrementally tightening unilateral sanc-
tions against Iran. By targeting a wide variety of sectors (nuclear, military, energy, 
shipping and transportation, insurance, and, most importantly, financial) the eco-
nomic impact has been significant [Arnold, 2015]. The United Nations has also 
adopted six resolutions in response to the Iranian nuclear file since 2006, four of 
which included a gradual expansion of sanctions.  
By 2012, the EU had adopted a series of autonomous sanctions to put additional 
pressure on the Iranian economy, particularly on the oil and banking sectors. The 
limitations on international financial transactions, the EU oil embargo as well as 
banking and insurance restrictions have squeezed Iran’s oil exports and severely 
constrained the country’s capacity to generate ‘petrodollars’.  Japan and South Ko-
rea, two major buyers of Iranian oil, have also begun to reduce their imports from 
Iran dramatically in response to US pressure. As a result, Iran’s crude oil production 
has fallen dramatically in recent years. 
In addition to insurance sanctions on oil tankers, which had a direct impact in curb-
ing Iranian oil exports globally, Iran’s forced exit from the SWIFT worldwide mes-
saging system used for international money transfers has severely curtailed the flow 
of oil revenue into the economy. Consequently, not only have the country’s ma-
jor oil buyers in Europe and Asia begun to reduce their imports of Iranian oil, but 
also the oil payments from the remaining exports have been delayed significantly. 
Meanwhile, replacing the US dollar as the currency used to buy and sell oil – which 
was utilised as a temporary measure to settle oil trades – has not resolved the issue. 
Since 2012, the country’s crude oil production has plummeted. As a result, Iran lost 
its position as second-largest producer within the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and fell to fourth position, behind Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Domestic economic mismanagement
Although escalation of international sanctions on Iran has indeed led to severe 
economic difficulties, it is also important to consider that the government’s mis-
management has made the economy more vulnerable to the effect of sanctions and 
indirectly contributed to its deterioration over the past few years. In other words, in 
combination with already existing problems besetting the economy, international 
sanctions have magnified Iran’s economic woes. 
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Figure 1: Iran’s total oil and gas exports 
Source for data: IMF, Islamic Republic of Iran: Country Report no. 14/93 (2014); 2015/2016 = forecast.
For nearly four decades, the Iranian economy has suffered from high unemploy-
ment, widespread inefficiency and corruption, rampant inflation, budget deficits, 
and excessive reliance on oil revenues to finance government expenditure (50-60%). 
The government has been the biggest economic player in Iran since the 1979 Revo-
lution. Since then, various public sector companies and financial institutions have 
been targeted by a panoply of unilateral international sanctions, specifically by the 
US. As a result, Iran has become increasingly isolated, with relatively limited expo-
sure to the global economy. 
A combination of the above-mentioned factors has created an unhealthy economic 
environment with long-standing structural challenges. The rates of real econom-
ic growth have frequently been negative. The private sector has performed weakly 
and its economic activities have been limited. The country has suffered from the 
flight of capital and talent for nearly four decades. Countries neighbouring Iran 
like Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have been quite successful 
in attracting foreign investment. In contrast, the Iranian market has failed to lure 
foreign investors.
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Figure 2: Iran real GDP 2011-2015 (% change y/y)
 Source for data: IMF (2014)
These structural economic problems deepened between 2005 and 2013. During this 
period, the government of former president Ahmadinejad began to apply new mac-
roeconomic policies in various areas (such as banking and finance), to enact subsidy 
reform, and to privatise government assets. The economic programmes of this pe-
riod were aimed at empowering lower income groups and the poorer regions of the 
country.
The key component of the government’s policy to achieve this aim was to distribute 
the economic benefits of the government’s oil revenues among lower-income house-
holds. The resulting distribution of cash payments – particularly through a targeted 
subsidies programme and small ‘quick return’ loans – led to a substantial increase 
in the money supply. This, combined with the country’s high levels of imports, led 
to soaring inflation, and damaged small-to-medium sized producers. Consequently, 
over the years, the government’s interventionist  policies in favour of lower-income 
groups have exacerbated the country’s economic problems. 
These problems were in turn magnified by the tightening of international economic 
sanctions on Iran. 
On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools
61 
The domestic political consequences
Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated as new Iranian president in August 2013, at a 
time when the country’s economy was at its lowest ebb since the Iran-Iraq war. The 
economy was experiencing stagflation, with a negative growth rate of -5.4%, and 44% 
year-on-year inflation. The unemployment rate was unofficially estimated to stand 
at levels as high as 20% – with women and young people being the most affected 
groups.
President Rouhani was perhaps the only presidential candidate in the 2013 election 
who promised to bring change. During his presidential campaign, he committed to 
resolve the nuclear deadlock so as to ease the imposed economic sanctions. 
Who was mostly negatively affected by sanctions?
Iran’s official position in relation to sanctions has been to frequently deny the hard-
ship caused by the imposition of these measures. This was perhaps a negotiating 
tactic for Tehran to avoid encouraging further sanctions, as the nuclear discussions 
under the new administration resumed. When analysing the domestic impacts of 
the sanctions on Iran, a few general observations can be made however on the way 
in which they have affected the economy, society and politics of the country. 
Iranian society can be divided into three main strata: the wealthy upper-middle class 
(including those that are well-connected to the Islamic Republic elite); the middle 
classes (most of whom are well-educated, professional liberal-minded residents of the 
larger cities); and a large lower-class group (the majority of whom are low-income citi-
zens, often residing in rural areas or poorer suburban areas and who have tradition-
ally had a fairly low standard of living). 
The first group has remained relatively invulnerable to sanctions, as their disposable 
income has been high enough to cushion them from the full effects of the measures. 
The third group, which had quite a low standard of living even before the sanctions 
were tightened, has experienced lesser impact on their livelihood partly because of 
the tangible rise in income generated by the subsidy reform cash handouts. It is the 
middle class which has suffered most from the sanctions.
Who benefited from sanctions?
The sanctions have spawned creative evasion strategies both inside and outside of 
Iran. In the thriving black market, new and lucrative business opportunities have 
been created for individuals and interest groups adept at devising ways of bypassing 
the sanctions regime. To mitigate the impact of sanctions, the Iranian government 
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has been constantly seeking to find alternative payment systems. Selling oil at dis-
counted rates, accepting non-dollar and oil-for-goods trades, and selling Iranian oil 
disguised as other crudes using ship-to-ship transfers, are among the subterfuges 
to which Iran has resorted in order to avoid a complete collapse of its crude export 
income. Relying on such mechanisms has been rather expensive and using unof-
ficial trade channels has created opportunities for interest groups to generate hefty 
profits from sanctions. 
The scandal of Babak Zanjani that erupted in 2014 is one example of such cor-
rupt and illicit business practices. Mr. Zanjani, a Dubai-based Iranian businessman, 
helped the government circumvent the US-led sanctions, for example by organising 
illegal oil exports and laundering oil money. The affair was made public after the 
launch of a parliamentary corruption investigation. Other cases, like the recent pur-
chase of 15 second-hand civilian aircraft through an Iraqi firm, are evidence of the 
extent to which extensive corruption channels exist both within and outside Iran.
As a result of the widespread corruption within the country’s economic system 
which sanctions have encouraged, the gap between rich and the poor in Iran has 
widened. For example, it transpired that over USD 2 billion of subsidised funds ear-
marked to finance the import of medicines were instead used to import luxury cars, 
to the benefit of upper-class Iranians. 
Dynamics of the Iranian political system
The success of President Rouhani during the 2013 presidential election was partly 
due to his campaign promise to lift the economy out of its protracted stagnation. 
Although that promise remains yet to be fulfilled, Rouhani’s administration has 
at least managed to lower inflation by more than half (from over 40%). Despite the 
remaining economic problems, the administration has been somewhat successful 
in convincing the population of the potentially fruitful outcome of the ongoing 
nuclear negotiations. 
Rouhani’s popular support has remained untouched while the July 2015 nuclear 
deal was being finalised. Rouhani’s supporters, largely drawn from the urban mid-
dle-classes, have been watching the negotiations, and speculating about the differ-
ence that the nuclear deal will make to their lives, patiently. They have not yet lost 
trust in his ability to deliver on his economic promises despite the limited visible 
improvements over the first years of his term in office. But in the long run, a failure 
to deliver clear progress in terms of living standards will undermine the president’s 
popularity.
As the next phase of the July 2015 agreement on the country’s nuclear programme 
with the E3+3 group sets in, the establishment needs a figure to associate with its 
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success – or failure. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has placed himself 
cautiously in between the pro-deal camp and those against it. This may be inter-
preted as Khamenei’s strategy to take the credit for a deal, if it is successful, but to 
avoid being blamed by the anxious Iranian public for any potential failure.
The often-ambiguous position of the Supreme Leader in the negotiations has al-
lowed the hardliner camp that oppose any nuclear deal – particularly in the Parlia-
ment (Majles) – to put pressure on the negotiating team. Given mounting economic 
hardship, the anti-nuclear deal factions would not stand much chance in selling 
their agenda to the majority of the Iranians. However, they can put the administra-
tion under pressure now that the deal is finalised. Therefore if the deal were to fail 
this would undoubtedly push the Islamic Republic into a more hardline position in 
which the moderate elements of the establishment will lose their bargaining power 
domestically and the trust of the Supreme Leader. 
The Islamic Republic has been convulsed by an internal power struggle, which led 
to a full-scale legitimacy crisis in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. 
As a result, the reformist elements in the parliament, who became known as the 
leaders of the ‘Green Revolution’, have been put under house arrest and labelled as 
‘seditionists’ by the hardliners. As the parliamentary election of 2016 looms, various 
conservative hardliners, including those known to be closer to the Supreme Leader, 
have raised concerns over the ‘seditionists’’ plans for the  takeover of the Majles. Un-
doubtedly, the race for the Majles elections will be eventful and if the transparency 
of the election is maintained, as Rouhani promised publicly, the result will reflect 
public support for a moderate, if not reformist, legislature. 
Sanctions’ effectiveness: an evaluation
As outlined in the first chapter of this report, sanctions can raise the costs of the tar-
get’s activities or force it into costly changes of economic strategy. The case of Iran 
reveals that sanctions have indeed been effective in constraining Tehran’s discre-
tionary policies, particularly in the oil and financial sectors. The pressure imposed 
by sanctions means the country was obliged to make concessions during negotia-
tions with the E3+3 (France, Germany, the UK, China, Russia and the US) in Laus-
anne, leading to the July 2015 agreement.
In addition, in their opening chapter Biersteker and van Bergeijk have highlighted 
that sanctions might succeed in constraining a target, in buying time for a negotiated 
settlement, or in signalling resolve about a norm that has important implications 
for the behaviour of other parties. Because of the nature of the sanctions imposed, 
particularly the autonomous ones, Iranian authorities became more responsive 
to the E3+3 demands as the pressure of sanctions mounted after 2011. While 
Iranian policymakers demonstrated willingness to compromise during the nuclear 
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negotiations, this may well be tentative and could be reversed should the agreement 
reached in 2015 come to unravel.
According to Biersteker and van Bergeijk, sanctions entail a theory of change. 
Indeed, the EU’s specific targeting of major sectors has been crucial in softening 
Iran’s position and encouraging the Iranian establishment to make more significant 
concessions. Moreover, the domestic political environment in Iran has shifted in 
response to sanctions. As noted above, the election of President Rouhani has been 
a clear signal of a change of the government’s stance and of people’s demands for a 
change of attitude both domestically and internationally.
Finally, as Biersteker and van Bergeijk argue, ‘sanctions bite most when they are 
unanticipated.’ As the economic growth and oil export graphs above show, sharp 
declines occurred at the early stages of the tightening of the sanctions, but  figures 
gradually stabilised over the following years. This may be partly due to the tempo-
rary freeze of sanctions during the negotiations as the E3+3 agreed not to impose 
any further major sanctions on Iran during the talks. But another important factor 
has been the alternative policies that the Islamic Government of Iran has adopted as 
a response to the escalation of sanctions.
All in all, the imposition of sanctions on Iran has led to a softening of Tehran’s 
stance in relation to the international community. However, they have also created 
domestic winners and losers whose respective interests are closely bound up with 
the future of the sanctions regime. While middle class and liberal-minded citizens 
are in favour of normalising relations with the international community and hope 
that the sanctions will ultimately be lifted, there are some interest groups which 
have made significant financial gains from the sanctions and who are therefore not 
necessarily happy about the prospect of their removal.
Conclusion
The Iranian economy has been plagued by various structural problems over the past 
few decades. The imposition of comprehensive sanctions on the country over its 
controversial nuclear programme has compounded these problems. Removal of 
sanctions after the July 2015 deal would certainly help the Iranian economy. But un-
less serious economic reforms are introduced, the country’s many structural prob-
lems will still remain. 
Since the sanctions were tightened in 2012, Iran has been able to manage a ‘siege 
economy’, or as the Supreme Leader put it, a ‘resistance economy’. The Iranian 
economy has continued functioning, albeit with difficulty, despite the external con-
straints of the past few years. It is also important to keep in mind that, should the 
implementation of the nuclear deal fail for any reason and the sanctions remain in 
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force, with some reshuffling of its macroeconomic policies, the government would 
still be able to manage economic affairs over a long period without the country fac-
ing a full-scale economic collapse. After all, Iran has become amply experienced at 
bypassing sanctions for almost a decade. However, under this scenario, middle-class 
Iranians who have hitherto borne the brunt of the sanctions would continue to pay 
a heavy price.
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VI. THE LIMITS TO THE SANCTIONS REGIME 
AGAINST SYRIA
Peter Seeberg
Introduction
Since the spring of 2011, international and regional actors have imposed a wide 
range of comprehensive sanctions on Syria, as well as targeted sanctions on indi-
viduals linked to the Assad government. Starting from May 2011, the European 
Union launched a set of sanctions aimed at putting pressure on the Assad regime 
and thereby inducing a change in its condemnable behaviour. While the EU’s dif-
ferent sanctions and embargoes have had a negative impact on the Syrian economy, 
the targeted members of the Syrian elite have – to a certain degree – been able to cir-
cumvent the individual sanctions, principally with the help of Russian and Iranian 
intermediaries. In addition, although the sanctions regime has been prolonged, its 
effectiveness – as measured by the degree of compliance by the Syrian authorities – 
has been undermined by a series of developments that have hindered progress. 
Firstly, a lack of consensus at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) made 
it impossible to undertake concerted multilateral action. Secondly the sanctioning 
states have not been able to constitute a coherent coalition. In addition, the Syrian 
regime’s reliance on allies in the UNSC, as well as on regional partners (particularly 
Hezbollah and Iran) have made it possible for the regime to survive, albeit precari-
ously. Moreover, following the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) into Syrian ter-
ritory, the targeted individuals in the regime’s inner circle have arguably chosen to 
reinforce their ties with the Assad regime rather than distance themselves from it. 
As a result, although sanctions have had a constraining impact by way of limiting 
the regime’s access to economic resources, complex conflict dynamics and shifting 
alliances have significantly muted their potency.
The initial aim of EU sanctions was to put pressure on the Syrian regime to stop its 
violent repression of the protests and demonstrations in Dar’a and other locations 
in Syria: Homs, Idlib, Deir ez-Zour, and later Aleppo and Damascus. The Syrian re-
gime decided not to enter into dialogue with the protestors. Rather, the crackdown 
on demonstrations was intensified. Unclear and unfulfilled promises of reforms 
and the lifting of a state of emergency did not have much significance in a country 
where the systematic deployment of security forces and combat troops to brutally 
suppress demonstrations effectively eliminated any chances of reconciliation. The 
confrontation did not immediately become militarised, however, and even though 
the local protests in some cases developed into armed resistance, it took almost a 
year before the situation developed into a full-scale civil war. 
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Relatively early (and before the conflict had escalated into a civil war), the EU – via 
Council Regulation No. 442 of 9 May 2011 – took the first step in launching a series 
of restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. The first round of sanctions tar-
geted 13 persons but by 19 May 2015, 222 persons and 71 entities had been included 
on the sanctions list. In addition to the sanctioning of persons, entities and bodies, 
a wide range of other types of sanctions were imposed including: an arms embargo, 
mandatory cargo inspections on vessels and aircraft travelling to and from Syria, an 
import ban on oil and petroleum products, a ban on investments within specific sec-
tors (e.g. the oil and natural gas industries, construction of electricity power plants), 
as well as a ban on exports of strategically significant equipment and technologies. 
Syria was also subjected to sanctions by regional actors like Turkey and the League 
of Arab Nations (Arab League) and by other international actors, primarily the US. 
The sanctions regime against Syria: five phases
Phase one
The Syrian uprising originated in Dar’a, a town in a mainly agricultural province close 
to the Jordanian border that, like many other provinces, was suffering the devastating 
effects of one of the worst droughts in the country’s recent history. Dar’a was perceived 
both by the regime and the opposition as largely loyal to the Baath government in Da-
mascus. But the arrest and subsequent torture of 15 schoolchildren who had painted 
anti-regime graffiti on the walls of a school in the town to protest against the gov-
ernment’s inaction towards the drought led to local gatherings of protestors, which 
on 18 March 2011 culminated in mass demonstrations. The local protests spread to 
other Syrian cities and later escalated into armed confrontations between the Syr-
ian forces and uncoordinated local militias. As the confrontations became more and 
more violent and ultimately militarised, opposition groups’ original demands for re-
form gradually gave way to regime change as the only acceptable solution. 
This had consequences for the way in which the sanctions were implemented. The 
sanctions regime initially had a relatively limited tangible impact. However, as the 
situation in Syria deteriorated, the sanctions regime became more hard-hitting and 
focused on sending a message to powerful political and economic actors that their 
support to the regime would come at a cost. It was hardly surprising that the first 
person who was exposed to EU targeted sanctions was Maher al-Assad: commander 
of the army’s 4th division, member of the Baath Party Central Command, strongman 
of the Republican Guard (and thus principal overseer of violence against demon-
strators) and brother of President Bashar al-Assad. Twelve other persons were also 
listed, the majority of whom belonged to the Syrian intelligence and security circles.
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It took only a year from the first round of sanctions before comprehensive EU sanc-
tions were enacted. Since the objective was to use the first round of sanctions to 
pressure the regime to alter its proscribed behaviour, it was important for the EU 
not to include the President, thus leaving open the option for concessions in nego-
tiations. 
Ultimately, the intention was to let the regime in Damascus know that the EU was 
aligning with the US when it came to sanctioning – and that the EU supported the 
Syrian opposition, as implied in statements on Syria by the then High Representa-
tive Catherine Ashton.
In the sanctions imposed on 23 May 2011, the President was added to the list to-
gether with nine others, so that the number of targeted persons rose to 23. Over 
the summer of 2011, further new names and entities were added to the EU sanc-
tions list. Compared to earlier EU sanctions of this kind, which often took years 
to be implemented, the sanctions against the regime in Syria were imposed quite 
swiftly. Together, these sanctions constituted a first phase, and the measures were 
bolstered over the course of the next few months. In this initial phase, international 
actors took part, but without deliberate coordination. The policy aimed at putting 
pressure on the political system by imposing restrictive measures on the decision-
makers and their supporters.
Phase two
In a second phase of sanctions, lasting from August 2011 until June 2012, the EU’s 
goal changed from seeking to alter the behaviour of the regime to working to bring 
about a situation where Bashar al-Assad would be forced to step down. In a state-
ment on 19 August 2011, High Representative Catherine Ashton argued that the 
regime in Damascus had lost all legitimacy. The sanctions list continued to expand, 
with additional individuals and entities targeted, including key Syrian ministers re-
sponsible for the escalation of the war in Syria. 
Furthermore, from September 2011, an EU import ban on oil and petroleum prod-
ucts was included in the sanctions, leading to a 90% and a 61% fall in EU imports 
and exports from and to Syria, respectively. Regional actors also entered the scene, 
thus putting further pressure on the regime by imposing sanctions in what looked 
like a coordinated effort to create a rift between Syria’s rulers and the political elite 
supporting them.
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Figure 1: EU trade flows and balance, annual data 2005 - 2014 
Source for data: EU Commission, DG Trade (2014)
Phase three
The next year saw a third phase emerge, characterised by a continuation of the re-
strictive measures from phases one and two. This phase lasted until April 2013, and 
since few new restrictions were added to the already imposed sanctions – in combi-
nation with little EU action vis-à-vis the situation in Syria – it seemed that the sanc-
tions regime was losing momentum. This bears out the commonly observed trend 
whereby sanctions tend to have the greatest impact in the initial years of their im-
plementation, principally due to the fact that targeted regimes frequently become 
adept at finding ways to circumvent sanctions.
Phase four
A significant turning point marking the emergence of a fourth phase took place in 
April 2013, when certain sanctions were modified due to changing circumstances. 
This included lifting the ban on exports from opposition-controlled areas of the 
country, a move intended to help the civilian population and support the opposition. 
Also in May 2013, new names, entities and bodies were added to the sanctions list, so 
that the fourth phase marked a return – compared to the relatively passive third phase 
– of a more active EU policy. However, from July 2013 until the end of the year no new 
sanctions were launched, while the civil war in Syria escalated further. 
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Syrian rebel and opposition forces began to be pushed back at the battlefield, partly 
because Hezbollah intervened on the side of the Syrian regime (a step which may have 
contributed to the decision to add Hezbollah’s military wing to the EU’s list of terror 
groups). In addition, the opposition continued to be torn by internal divisions and 
thus unable to present a reliable alternative to the regime. Furthermore, the need to 
deal with the issue of Syrian chemical weapons made negotiations necessary, resulting 
in the successful removal and destruction of the regime’s chemical weapons arsenals. 
Responding positively to calls for a solution to the conflict, the EU supported differ-
ent peace conference initiatives, in the hope that some kind of political resolution of 
the deadlocked situation in Syria might be found. The initiatives did not materialise 
in subsequent action, which led to significant changes on the ground in Syria.
Phase five
Finally, a fifth phase can be identified following the advent of a number of radical 
Islamist militias, the most notorious being IS. In 2013, Jabhat al-Nusrah merged with 
IS, branding themselves as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Given that 
both groups had already been taking part in the fighting in Syria, their military capa-
bilities increased. As a result of their merger, they renamed themselves Islamic State 
in June 2014, and proclaimed the creation of a global Islamic caliphate. Their emer-
gence added a complex security dimension to the already problematic realities on the 
ground in Syria, with which the EU continues to struggle. The sanctions policy aimed 
at constraining the Syrian regime was henceforth indirectly integrated under a more 
comprehensive EU security strategy adopted by the Council on 16 March 2015.
This did not however mean that the sanctions policy had been abandoned, as in 
May 2015 the EU added four persons and two entities to its Syrian sanctions list, 
this time targeting the Syrian business sector. In reality, however, the EU was in-
creasingly focused on counter-terrorism and how to develop a strategy for a region 
in turmoil, in particular given the existential threat posed by IS. 
The EU sanctions and the Syrian regime
Impact of sanctions
There is hardly any doubt that the sanctions have had significantly negative conse-
quences for the Syrian regime, yet not to a degree where the survival of the regime 
has been jeopardised. In principle, sanctions like those imposed on Syria should be 
expected to constrain the ability of a targeted regime to continue pursuing a rep-
rehensible course of action. During the first phase, it seems that the sanctions had 
only a limited success in inducing defections from loyalists in the Syrian elite. 
72 
ISSReportNo.25
Apparently, this changed during the second phase, where some army officers de-
fected and an increasing – yet still relatively small – number of business people fled 
to the Gulf or elsewhere in search of safety. 
The regime-loyal Syrian business elite were well aware that the continued existence 
of their economic resources was linked to the survival of the regime. In order to 
protect their economic interests they applied a variety of strategies. They attempted, 
with some success, to bypass the sanctions by doing business via accounts in Rus-
sian and Iranian banks. Furthermore they adopted a strategy of ‘hedging their bets’ 
by trying to diversify their economic activities or, if possible, reestablish production 
or trading activities elsewhere in the region.
As the internal crisis in Syria intensified during the third and fourth phases, this 
trend gradually disappeared. Most likely, the absence of a coherent and credible 
opposition played an important role in persuading the political and business elite 
not to risk turning away from the regime. Furthermore, in phase five, the increasing 
involvement of IS (and other radical Islamist groups) in the civil war also tended 
to strengthen the backing of the regime in Damascus. Fearing that the alternative 
(a Syria dominated by IS) would be much worse, the Syrian elite stayed loyal to the 
regime, thus reducing the intended impact of the EU’s targeted sanctions.
At the regional level, Syria was suspended from the Arab League and found itself 
on a collision course with Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf States. Hit by regional sanc-
tions (as well as by the international sanctions) the regime experimented with a 
‘Look East’ campaign, urging Syrian businesses to approach partners in Iran, Iraq, 
India and China, apparently with only moderate success. It should be mentioned, 
however, that this goal of tapping into the potential of eastern markets was part of 
a Syrian trade liberalisation strategy that preceded the current crisis, but never really 
worked.
The international actors have imposed heavy sanctions on Syria, and in the case of 
the EU these have been enacted on an unprecedented scale. Through the combina-
tion of the oil embargo and other general sanctions, as well as the targeted sanctions 
(so far) on 222 persons and 71 entities, the regime has been severely constrained in 
its ability to carry out transactions and to operate on international financial mar-
kets. However, in order to understand the reason for a changing EU security strat-
egy, it is necessary to go back to the years before the start of the Arab uprisings.
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Change of focus: from the Syrian regime to regional security
Several years before the inception of the Syrian crisis, attempts at reaching an agree-
ment between the EU and Syria within the framework of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP) took place. In 2008, a draft Association Agreement (AA) was 
updated to take into account changes in Syrian customs rules and also important 
institutional changes on the EU side. The AA was agreed upon in December 2008 
and the EU declared that it was ready to sign the document a year later. The im-
portance of the agreement relates to the fact that it represented a potentially new 
and promising situation for Syria in its (often highly problematic) relations with 
the West. In July of the same year, Bashar al-Assad also participated in the launch-
ing of the Union for the Mediterranean in Paris.
The EU member states agreed in October 2009 that they wanted to sign the AA, 
but the Syrian regime responded with a request for more time to further examine 
the agreement and then the process was postponed. In May 2011, in connection 
with the launching of the first restrictive measures, the EU froze the AA and also 
suspended all bilateral programmes with Syria. Four years later, the EU presented 
a counter-terrorism strategy (January 2015) and a regional strategy (March 2015), 
the latter entitled ‘Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da’esh threat’ – at the same 
time as it underlined that it would continue its sanctions policy, imposing ad-
ditional sanctions against the Syrian regime, which is seen as bearing the main 
responsibility for the cataclysmic developments in Syria since early 2011.  
Neither of these strategies were meant to stand alone, but should be seen in the con-
text of the EU’s wider foreign and security policy towards Syria (and Iraq), includ-
ing support to the moderate Syrian opposition with the aim of restoring political 
stability in the region. It was thus envisaged that counter-terrorist actions should be 
combined with renewed efforts to bring about a political transition in Syria.
Conclusion
All evidence points to the fact that EU sanctions have clearly had a negative eco-
nomic impact, particularly on Syrian foreign trade. It is however more difficult to 
assess their actual impact on the targeted individuals, although there is hardly any 
doubt that the international and regional sanctions together have substantially con-
strained the Syrian elite as a whole. Nonetheless, the negative effect of the restrictive 
measures has – to a certain degree – been counteracted by the ability of targeted 
individuals to circumvent them by resorting to alternative economic channels, par-
ticularly Russian and Iranian banks, or through strategies of ‘hedging their bets’.
In line with these observations, and despite appeals for united and concerted ac-
tion to help end the escalating violence in Syria, Russia and China have repeatedly 
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blocked resolutions in the UNSC, which could have otherwise led to an intervention 
campaign. The conflicting interests among the permanent member states in the 
UNSC have without doubt contributed to making the EU sanctions less effec-
tive. The same goes for the US sanctions and the many other sanctions applied by 
actors within or outside of the MENA region. The states sanctioning Syria have 
never constituted a strong and coherent coalition, and generally the outcome of 
the sanctions has been relatively limited. They have contributed to the crippling 
of the Syrian economy and created constraints for the Syrian elite, but apparently 
have not succeeded in severing the links between the regime and its close support-
ers in the army and business elite.
The Syrian regime has been able to build its survival strategy in part due to the 
weaknesses affecting the coalition marshalled against it. Knowing that they had 
strong allies in the UNSC (Russia and China) and that they could rely on regional 
allies (Hezbollah and Iran), the Syrian leaders calculated that they were able to 
withstand the pressure. They could have reached out to moderates in the opposi-
tion and attempted a negotiated transition, but decided not to, probably because 
they knew that this might result in the end of the Baathist regime. In light of what 
happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the regime instead chose a strategy based 
on violent suppression of the internal opposition and rejection of any external 
interference, except regarding the removal of chemical weapons. 
The EU sanctions have without doubt contributed to a relative weakening of what 
used to be key institutions of the Syrian regime: the Baath Party, the ministries, 
municipalities, government-related organisations and government-run NGOs. 
The corrupt political culture based on nepotism and patronage has come under 
pressure and been undermined by the sanctions. Nevertheless, in a situation where 
the regime and the internal elite have been able to rely on significant external sup-
port from their allies throughout the crisis, the EU’s abilities to control Syria’s 
external relations have been limited. 
As security policy tools, the sanctions have had a constraining impact rather than 
a strong coercing one. In response to the sanctions, the Assad regime has not sig-
nificantly moderated its internationally reprehensible actions but its ability to ac-
cess economic resources has been constrained. Nonetheless, by focusing attention 
on the ongoing atrocities occurring within Syria, sanctioning actors have clearly 
signalled that the international community will not tolerate the state-instigated 
human rights abuses that have taken place in Syria. So far, however, the intransi-
gent Assad regime has appeared impervious to international condemnation and 
threats. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Iana Dreyer, Francesco Giumelli, José Luengo-Cabrera and Clara Portela
This chapter draws conclusions from the various case studies presented in the re-
port. In the first section, the case studies are considered in light of the ‘success crite-
ria’ outlined by Biersteker and van Bergeijk in chapter I. The second section identi-
fies possible policy implications and points to further areas for research.  
I. Key findings
Effectiveness
Although the effects of sanctions are experienced differently depending on how 
they are implemented and what form they take, their overall impact is one of raising 
the cost of pursuing the proscribed activities carried out by the target. As a result, 
sanctions act as instruments intended to change a target’s cost-benefit calculation 
vis-à-vis its objectionable behaviour. 
Sanctions have traditionally been seen as ‘working’ only when they induce or 
prompt a behavioural change on the part of the target, but the factors influencing 
the target’s behaviour are often affected by causes other than the sanctions. There-
fore, the confluence of causal factors and mechanisms emerges as a hindrance to the 
ability to isolate the true impact of sanctions – thereby raising potential questions 
regarding their underlying utility.
Standard practice has viewed sanctions’ effectiveness on the basis of whether they 
achieve ultimate – as opposed to piecemeal – goals. This has often led to misguided 
conclusions that have tended to view sanctions as ineffective foreign and security 
policy tools. In order to counter this trend, the analytical framework that has guided 
this report has given greater importance to piecemeal goals: the compliance demands 
to which targets respond progressively and incrementally.
All sanctioning actors set out ultimate goals when designing their sanctions regimes. 
In the case of the EU, ultimate goals are viewed through the lens of full compliance, 
but targets rarely comply fully within short time-frames. This has raised questions as 
to whether the litmus test for effectiveness should be based on ultimate goals. Were 
that to be the case, it would be appropriate to consider sanctions against Iran and 
Russia as being effective only if and when the Islamic Republic suspends its nuclear 
programme or the Kremlin decides to pull out of Eastern Ukraine, for example.
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This threshold or benchmark of effectiveness has appeared to be too stringent for 
preliminary assessments of sanctions regimes, principally as it omits or simply ne-
glects the progressive steps through which compliance tends to work. Consequent-
ly, this report has proposed a new narrative whereby the efficacy of sanctions is not 
limited to the eventual behavioural change but, rather, to the way in which sanc-
tions have induced targets to comply with the demands of the senders over time 
through their coercive, constraining and signalling effects.
In the cases of Iran, Russia and Syria, sanctions have had an approximate impact 
in prompting Iranian authorities back to the negotiating table to strike a deal on a 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), limiting Russia’s military expansion 
in Eastern Ukraine and preventing the Assad regime from having access to impor-
tant economic resources. As a result, the report points to an underlying utility of 
sanctions as security policy tools by way of demonstrating how they have reduced 
the capacity of targets to continue pursuing policies or actions deemed to spread 
insecurity within their territory and beyond. 
Signalling and constraining
Signalling is a primary driver of sanctions policy in all three cases. Signalling is about 
reaffirming international treaties and norms (such as nuclear non-proliferation, re-
spect for human rights and the territorial integrity of other states), as well as stig-
matising the targets so as to increase their international isolation.  In the Russian 
case, sanctions were initially about signalling disapproval of Russia’s violation of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Signalling was also paramount in the case of Syria, 
where the threat and actual imposition of further sanctions materialised as the As-
sad regime remained unresponsive to the demands of sanctioning actors. As for 
Iran, the credible prospect of the imposition of further sanctions served to force 
the hand of the Iranian authorities and persuade them to return to the negotiating 
table with a view to striking a mutually acceptable deal. 
All three EU sanctions regimes also aimed at constraining the ability of targets to car-
ry out their proscribed activities. In the case of Russia, sanctions made it more costly 
for the Kremlin to continue its aggressive stance towards Ukraine through restrict-
ing state-owned and private enterprises’ access to capital markets. In the case of 
Iran, the EU’s imposed oil and gas embargo (coupled with the US determination to 
freeze Iranian assets in overseas foreign escrow accounts) significantly constrained 
Iran’s ability to generate vital economic revenue. Given their crippling effects, sanc-
tions were seen as primary drivers in prompting Iranian leaders to reconsider their 
stance vis-à-vis the nuclear programme.
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Trade matters
The importance of trade linkages between the sender and the target is highlighted 
throughout all three case studies. The impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy 
became much more significant when the EU – one of Iran’s most important trading 
partners pre-sanctions – joined the US in imposing restrictive measures against the 
Islamic Republic. What is more, the sanctions adopted since 2010 were far-reaching, 
involving an oil and gas embargo as well as cutting off Iranian banks from interna-
tional payments via the SWIFT worldwide messaging system. 
High degrees of trade integration also help explain why EU sanctions towards 
Russia may remain limited in their severity, due to the fact that sanctions can also 
hurt the sender. Russia was the EU’s third largest trading partner in early 2014. It 
delivers one third of the EU’s hydrocarbons needs, is a sizeable export market for 
European industry, and its financial sector is deeply integrated with the European 
financial sector. These realities have added to the political and diplomatic consid-
erations which have so far deterred the EU from taking drastic measures (such as 
sanctioning Russia’s gas export monopoly Gazprom directly or cutting off SWIFT 
payments). Also, a bigger trading partner may retaliate with counter-sanctions. This 
is precisely what happened with Russia, as the country banned the import of food 
from the EU and imposed travel bans on Western officials.
In contrast, comparatively low economic integration between Syria and the EU – in 
tandem with Syria’s drift towards a war economy – may explain the limited effects 
of the EU’s trade embargoes in prompting the Assad regime to change policy. More-
over, the regime’s ability to circumvent sanctions by resorting to alternative eco-
nomic channels has mitigated the negative impact deriving from important trade 
restrictions. 
Waning effects
The argument of chapter I that sanctions tend to succeed best in the initial years 
of implementation is clearly corroborated by the case studies. The immediate eco-
nomic and psychological shock induced by the sanctions has undoubtedly led to a 
change in tactics by the targets in all three cases. Van Bergeijk’s Iran case study high-
lights that the effects of sanctions tend to wear out over time. Despite the relatively 
direct effect of sanctions on the Russian economy, Moscow has nonetheless actively 
engaged in a strategy of economic adjustment, as explored by Richard Connolly in 
chapter II. The targeted sanctions against officials in the entourage of Syrian Presi-
dent Bachar al-Assad contributed to a series of defections shortly after they came 
into force. But, as Peter Seeberg’s case study shows, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) 
had the counterproductive effect of rallying the Syrian elite closer to the regime.
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Staying credible
Credibility issues and ‘strategic interaction’ play a fundamental role in the dynam-
ics shaping the Iran and Russia case studies.
The Iran case is self-evident: the difficult but eventually successful negotiation pro-
cess over the JCPOA reveals how uncertain a deal can be until the very moment of 
its conclusion. Once an agreement is struck, the degree to which sanctions can be 
deemed successful depends – to a large extent – on the compliance ‘responsiveness’ 
of the target. Yet the degree to which Tehran will abide by the terms of the July 2015 
JCPOA will also be crucially influenced by the sanctioning actors’ own credibility in 
rewarding Iranian compliance with concomitant sanctions relief.
In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, the challenge for the EU appears to have been 
that of building credibility vis-à-vis Russia. Stanislav Secrieru’s study shows that Rus-
sia’s responsiveness to sanctions, albeit limited, can be explained by its apparent 
surprise at the EU 28’s unanimity in adopting and extending the sanctions. 
Strengthening the rulers?
The sanctions regimes studied in this report have also had counterproductive effects 
by way of creating rent-seeking opportunities for the targets at fault.  Sanctions seem 
to have strengthened the current political regime in Russia and empowered the most 
nationalist and state-dependent factions in the Kremlin. Similarly, they bolstered cer-
tain interest groups attached to the Iranian regime who profited from the illicit busi-
ness opportunities created as a result of sanctions. The sanctions against Russia have 
also had the often-observed effect of most sanctions regimes: rallying the population 
‘around the flag’. Sara Bazoobandi’s and Peter van Bergeijk’s Iran case studies show 
that the ‘rally around the flag’ effect has not been quite as strong in Iran. Strength-
ened sanctions coincided with (but did not cause) a relative opening up of Iran’s po-
litical system. In the very different Syrian case, the target appears to have little to gain 
from being responsive to the demands of the sanctioning actors in a situation where 
regime survival takes precedence over everything else. Under this scenario, their risk-
calculations become skewed as holding on to power trumps all other alternatives.
Leveraging multilateralism  
The unresponsiveness of the Assad regime may also be ascribed to the failure of the dif-
ferent regional and international actors to stick to a common multilateral sanctions 
strategy. In the Iran case, sanctions are not only UN-backed but also complemented 
by unilateral sanctions coordinated between the US, EU, Canada, Australia and Japan, 
thus offering high international legitimacy, as well as effective enforcement. 
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The case of Russia – a permanent member of the UN Security Council – intrinsically 
precludes the possibility of high-level multilateral commitment. The US, the EU 
and their close allies (including Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Japan and Ukraine) 
have not been able to rally other governments – such as China and other emerging 
powers – to the idea of imposing restrictive measures against Russia, thereby limit-
ing the sanctions’ economic bite and support at global level. 
Clear goals and multiple instruments
Biersteker and van Bergeijk find that ‘narrowly defined goals and multiple policy 
instruments increase the success rate of sanctions’. In the Russian case, the EU has 
gradually made more explicit the conditions under which it would roll back or esca-
late sanctions (notably by tying the lifting of sanctions to compliance with the Feb-
ruary 2015 Minsk-II ceasefire agreement). This offers a potentially more effective 
basis for discussion and interaction with Russia in the coming months. 
In the Iran case, the goals of the UN sanctions were clearly articulated from the out-
set and the multilateral pressure has increased over the years. Other tactics, includ-
ing the more or less veiled threat of military force, were also part of the panoply of 
instruments used to pressure Iran back to the negotiating table. 
Targeted vs. comprehensive
Chapter I indicates that targeted sanctions (against individuals or specific entities) 
achieve comparable success rates in delivering their intended goals. In the case of 
Iran, the sanctioning of individuals supporting the regime, as well as important 
state-owned oil and gas companies, played a significant role in restricting Iran’s 
economic output. Though much less drastic than the Iran sanctions, the financial 
restrictions against Russia of July and September 2015 have also prompted a certain 
degree of response from Moscow. 
When it comes to wide-reaching, comprehensive economic sanctions, political deci-
sions over whether to take such measures hinge on what economic costs a sender 
is willing to accept to ‘pay’ in order to achieve its international security objectives. 
They also hinge on what level of responsibility it wants to bear for potential negative 
humanitarian consequences on a target country’s population. 
The EU, in contrast to the US, faces specific challenges with its sanctions targeted at 
individual and commercial entities, mainly because these are often contested in the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Several Syrian individuals were delisted after the 
Court ruled in their favour – obliging the EU to pay compensation for damages. The 
Russian company Rosneft and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) have also 
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filed complaints at the Luxembourg-based court, with both cases ongoing. Legal 
setbacks risk undermining the severity of ‘targeted’ sanctions, their international 
credibility, and ultimately their effectiveness. 
One recurrent problem the EU has faced in court is its inability to provide adequate 
evidence on the alleged links between an individual or a commercial entity and the 
targeted regime. Evidence gathered through national intelligence services cannot be 
easily divulged in court. In response to this problem, the EU took the decision in 
July 2015 to introduce closed hearings at the General Court in Luxembourg. 
II. Policy implications
The policy implications drawn below do not aim at offering a detailed blueprint for 
the EU’s future sanctions policies. This section simply attempts to pinpoint some 
areas on which the EU can focus – taking the Union’s current institutional setup 
and financial constraints as a given – in order to gradually enhance its ability to 
conduct more effective and evidence-based CFSP sanctions policies.
Strengthening capacities 
The number of EU sanctions has increased significantly over the last two decades. It 
is likely that EU policymakers will continue to deal with a high number of sanctions 
regimes in the upcoming years. 
Well-designed sanctions require significant local knowledge. Sanctions profession-
als and academics consulted throughout the duration of the EUISS Task Force have 
regularly highlighted the need for officials and experts to be involved in designing 
sanctions regimes in Brussels in order to better grasp the often obscure and complex 
realities of a political regime and of the rapidly changing situations on the ground. 
The most frequent challenge lies with deepening knowledge of the evolving devel-
opments within a target country, how sanctions targets (governments, individuals, 
companies) behave pre- and post-sanctions implementation, and how a regime, an 
economy and a local society react to the sanctions. 
Information on individuals targeted by sanctions is particularly challenging to ob-
tain. Sufficient evidence needs to be gathered to ensure sanctions do not end up 
being annulled by the ECJ. And some (but not all) EU member states have greater 
analytical capacities, more foreign policy experience and more sophisticated intel-
ligence capacities than the nascent group of sanctions professionals within EU in-
stitutions in Brussels (in the Commission, Council Secretariat or EEAS). 
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The case of the EU’s sanctions on Russia shows that, over the past year, the EU has 
been able to adjust and improve its strategy, communication and interaction with 
Russia in Eastern Ukraine. This has coincided with greater efforts in staffing and 
expert mobilisation on behalf of the Brussels-based institutions. If the EU had been 
better equipped before 2014, however, it could have taken decisions more swiftly 
and articulated clearer conditions for escalation or de-escalation of sanctions. The 
bloc could probably have gained greater leverage over Russia at an earlier stage.
Streamlined and better integrated decision-making, information-sharing, and im-
plementation procedures could contribute to more responsive and effective sanc-
tions policy. In the absence of more exclusive CFSP-related competencies and/or a 
dedicated agency for sanctions comparable to the US’s Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol (OFAC) – both unrealistic objectives under current treaties – other options may 
be explored to coordinate and centralise information at a pan-European level. Such 
options could include: more systematic and structured exchange of information 
with member states’ intelligence services; a stronger role for the ‘sanctions group’ in 
the Council dedicated to foreign affairs (RELEX); more systematic collaboration be-
tween the Commission, the EEAS and the Council, as well as an increase in national 
experts seconded to Brussels. Over the medium to longer term, a gradual build-up 
of in-house knowledge and expertise within common institutions can help the EU 
become a more credible, flexible, and effective sanctions sender. In this regard, hav-
ing systematic recourse to ex-post and (when possible) ex-ante evaluations of sanc-
tions regimes by relevant experts could contribute to achieving that goal. 
Engaging partners
As highlighted in this report, multilateral sanctions tend to be more effective than 
unilateral ones. Multilateralism not only enhances the sanctions’ international politi-
cal legitimacy, it also diminishes the likelihood of the target’s trade and financial flows 
being diverted to third countries (thus cushioning the impact of sanctions). When the 
EU works with the UN, the US, and other allies, the effectiveness of sanctions appears 
to be clearly enhanced. The Iran case examined in this report showcases this fact clear-
ly. But this is not always how sanctions policies work out. Other regional or interna-
tional players may disagree with the sanctions senders and/or hope to gain economic 
advantage from the trade diversion opportunities offered by restrictive measures.
Coalescing with ‘pivotal’ rising powers – like for instance India, Brazil, Turkey and 
Indonesia –  on international sanctions will remain challenging. Yet working more 
closely with like-minded emerging powers would undoubtedly contribute to broad-
en support for multilateral sanctions regimes. This is becoming all the more impor-
tant at a time when the UN Security Council continues to be divided, and when the 
global relative economic weight of the EU and the US – the world’s main sanctions 
senders – continues to decline. 
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Attention to sanctions design and communication can also increase the interna-
tional legitimacy of sanctions. Defining clearly articulated, relatively narrow sanc-
tions goals aimed at resolving concrete situations that evidently violate internation-
al law can help reduce the exposure to criticism that sanctions pursue foreign policy 
goals (e.g. ‘regime change’) of which many countries disapprove.
Exit strategies
Sanctions policies need a dynamic element that facilitates their (rapid) adjustment, 
as often required by developments on the ground. Escalation and de-escalation are 
central in most crises, and sanctions policies need to react and adapt. ‘Exit strate-
gies’ – recognised as a particular challenge in chapter I - are easier to frame and 
implement when a sanctions regime specifies the flexibility and adjustability of its 
goals from the outset.
While CFSP sanctions often spell out the reasons for their imposition, they are not 
always backed up with concrete compliance demands that condition any future lift-
ing of sanctions. Yet the targeted nature of EU sanctions packages, normally com-
posed of multiple measures, already makes it possible to link specific demands to 
individual measures. The sanctions towards Russia are a case in point: the Crimea/
Sevastopol package refers to the annexation of Crimea and remains separate from 
the measures addressing the destabilisation of the Donbass region. This approach 
communicates to the target that the lifting of restrictive measures is conditional on 
the fulfilment of different demands and, therefore, offers a clearer basis for interac-
tion with the sanctions target. 
The question of how best to lift sanctions is a central yet scarcely analysed issue 
in the design of sanctions regimes. Currently, EU policy already presents a set of 
features favourable to a smooth transition between sanctions regimes and full re-
sumption of normal relations with a target country or group. Instead of being open-
ended, EU sanctions regimes are endowed with so-called ‘sunset clauses’ which fore-
see their expiration in the absence of a positive decision on continuation. Sanctions 
regimes are routinely phased out in several steps. Most importantly, the lifting of 
sanctions follows a gradual and conditional logic that eases restrictions as the tar-
get edges towards compliance, with a view to incentivising further progress. Ideally, 
the easing of sanctions should be prompted by the target’s visible progress towards 
compliance. Under this scenario, the lifting is organised in several phases, whereby 
restrictions unrelated to the disputed policy are likely to be removed first. 
Yet the desire to ease sanctions might be motivated by reasons other than those set 
out in the initial sanctions policy. At times, the EU grows uneasy with situations of 
prolonged and ever less effective sanctions, which leads it to consider creative ‘exit 
strategies’. Also, concern for the suffering of the population in target countries at war, 
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such as in Syria, might compel the EU to ease some measures. This can be initiated 
by expanding humanitarian exceptions and exemptions, while those measures that 
convey political condemnation of a government’s course of action are left in place.        
More often than not, multiple actors target the same situation with measures dif-
fering in scope and objectives. Regarding Syria, the US, the EU, the Arab League 
and Turkey currently target the Assad regime, yet they do not constitute a coherent 
coalition. The co-existence of multiple but uncoordinated and sometimes overlap-
ping sanctions regimes creates a number of difficulties that make any future lifting 
more difficult. By contrast, the Iran deal offers an example of successful – if atypical 
– multilateral cooperation.
Areas for further research
This report is an initial assessment of ongoing EU sanctions regimes as security 
policy tools. The EUISS Task Force’s goals have been circumscribed to assessing 
three ongoing cases in light of current knowledge and expertise on international 
sanctions. But much more can be done to obtain a better understanding of how EU 
sanctions ‘work’. The ultimate goal of gradually building up knowledge is to shape 
more effective policies in the future. Key areas that have been identified by Task 
Force members for further analysis and research include the following: 
· Sanctions enforcement, i.e. gaining a better understanding of how EU sanctions 
are enforced in practice by EU member states. 
· Role of the private sector, i.e. understanding how companies from sanctioning coun-
tries cope with sanctions regimes; how far financial institutions ‘over-comply’ 
with the legal requirements of sanctions regimes – or, conversely, when targets 
manage to circumvent sanctions (and why).
· ‘Efficiency’ of sanctions, i.e. undertaking more systematic cost-benefit analyses of 
sanctions, assessing the economic costs for the sender as set against the interna-
tional security goals these sanctions intend to achieve.
Needless to say, unexpected developments in the near future may mean that this 
tentative checklist needs to be further elaborated.
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ANNEXES
TASK FORCE MEETINGS
1. EU sanctions as security policy tools: Launch meeting 
 Thursday 26 February 2015 
2. EU sanctions as security policy tools: Syria & Iran
 Wednesday 25 March 2015
3. EU sanctions as security policy tools: Russia
 Thursday 23 April 2015
4. EU sanctions as security policy tools: Final meeting
 Tuesday 19 May 2015
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